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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Taking the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, the current thesis sets out to 
investigate self in a European context. For this purpose, the thesis first thoroughly 
reviews the most prominent conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology, 
specifically focusing on disentangling the term interdependence. Thereafter, the 
thesis critically examines the most common measures of self and appropriates some 
of these measures for use in the current empirical study. More concretely, the 
current study compares self-descriptions and autobiographical memories of 
individuals from post-Communist Europe and Scandinavia. The study’s results 
exemplify participants’ interdependence, whether in the form of their relational and 
group self-descriptions or their autobiographical memories recalled to different 
interpersonal cue words. On the whole, the current thesis contributes with novel 
data to the field of cross-cultural psychology, specifically highlighting the utility of 
autobiographical memories as measures of self. 
The thesis’ Chapter 1, Introduction, argues for the thesis’ relevance in the context 
of cross-cultural psychology. On the one hand, the chapter notes that cross-cultural 
research on self has been dominated by large-scale West (North America) versus 
East (East Asia) comparisons, largely inspired by the seminal paper by Markus and 
Kitayama (1991). For instance, within-European investigations of a similar kind 
have been scarce, and direct post-Communist and Scandinavian comparisons are 
nonexistent. On the other hand, the chapter points out that the validity of existing 
measures of self, in particular the Likert-type rating scales, has been questioned. 
The chapter concludes by stipulating the thesis’ research question and defining 
some of the thesis’ key terms. 
Chapter 2, Theoretical framework, begins with a brief presentation of the field of 
cross-cultural psychology and of some of its central concepts, such as culture and 
individualism-collectivism. Thereafter, the chapter provides an overview of the 
most prominent conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology: Markus and 
Kitayama’s (1991) model of independent and interdependent self as well as the 
model’s refinements, namely Brewer and Gardner’s (1996) relational and collective 
self and Kagitcibasi’s (2005) autonomous-related self. The conceptualization of self 
as inherently autobiographical (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002; Wang, 2001) is 
presented last. After summarizing all the previously presented theories in text and 
graphically (Figure 5), the chapter proceeds to outline the most popular approaches 
to measuring self in cross-cultural psychology. Likert-type rating scales, most 
notably the Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994), are discussed in light of the 
extensive critique of their validity. Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 
1954), a representative of open-ended methodological approaches, is described 
next. Finally, the chapter introduces autobiographical memories as novel measures 
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of self and briefly mentions various accessibility, content, and form characteristics 
of autobiographical memories that have been utilized in this respect. The chapter 
ends by presenting the rationale for the current study. 
Chapter 3, Methodology, outlines the design of the current study. Moreover, the 
chapter describes the study’s participants, who based on their nationality (Slovak, 
Norwegian, and Danish) and age (adolescents and older adults) fall into several 
subsamples. While particular aspects of the data collection procedure varied across 
these subsamples, all participants of the current study were asked to describe 
themselves via the aforementioned Twenty Statements Test as well as to recall and 
report autobiographical memories in a written questionnaire. Thereby obtained self-
descriptions as well as autobiographical memories were subsequently analysed for 
their content; the chapter highlights some of the issues that arose during the coding 
process. The last section of Chapter 3 concerns ethical considerations.  
Chapter 4, Results, presents the current study’s results in the form of four 
independent manuscripts. As a starting point, Manuscript 1, a theoretical book 
chapter, provides a concise overview of the field of cross-cultural psychology. 
Specifically, the manuscript introduces some of the field’s key notions, namely 
culture, values, and self, followed by some of the field’s main lines of investigation, 
such as research on cultural value dimensions, self-types, emotions as well as 
developmental issues. Next, Manuscript 2 is an empirical article that investigates 
the importance of three interpersonal settings (family, school, and friends) for 
Norwegian and Slovak adolescents’ self-development, as it is reflected in various 
characteristics of the adolescents’ autobiographical memories recalled about these 
settings. Manuscript 3 is also an empirical article, this time examining relational 
and collective interdependence in two generations from Slovakia and Denmark. For 
this purpose, the manuscript utilizes the Twenty Statements Test. Finally, 
Manuscript 4 is both a theoretical as well as methodological contribution, since it 
proposes a new approach to the content analysis of autobiographical memories. 
Chapter 5, Discussion, discusses the previously presented results of each of the 
manuscripts individually. Afterward, the results are combined into a general 
discussion, and that depending on whether they address particular theoretical or 
methodological issues or whether they concern the study’s empirical results. While 
the theoretical discussion brings some of the referenced conceptualizations of self 
into comparison, the methodological discussion highlights the benefits of content 
analysis as well as the utility of autobiographical memories as measures of self. 
Results of the two empirical articles are combined in a separate section. Finally, the 
thesis’ overall contributions are pointed out, followed by a reminder of the thesis’ 
limitations and a proposal of directions for future research. 
The thesis ends with concluding remarks in Chapter 6, Conclusion. 
V 
DANSK RESUME 
Inden for en tværkulturel psykologisk referenceramme ønsker denne Ph.d.-
afhandling at undersøge selvet i en europæisk kontekst. Først gennemgår Ph.d.-
afhandlingen de mest fremtrædende konceptualiseringer af selvet på området med 
et særligt fokus på begrebet interdependence. Derefter giver Ph.d.-afhandlingen en 
kritisk oversigt over de mest anvendte måleredskaber af selvet og udvælger nogle af 
disse til brug i den nærværende empiriske undersøgelse. Mere konkret 
sammenligner undersøgelsen selvbeskrivelser og selvbiografiske erindringer af 
individer fra det postkommunistiske Europa og fra Skandinavien. Undersøgelsens 
resultater eksemplificerer deltagernes interdependence, i form af deres relationelle 
og kollektive selvbeskrivelser eller deres selvbiografiske erindringer genkaldt til 
forskellige interpersonelle stikord. Overordet set bidrager denne Ph.d.-afhandling 
med ny data til det tværkulturelle psykologiske område samt fremhæver 
anvendeligheden af selvbiografiske erindringer som måleredskaber af selvet. 
Afhandlingens Kapitel 1, Introduktion, argumenterer for Ph.d.-afhandlingens 
relevans i forhold til tværkulturel psykologi. På den ene side påpeger kapitlet, at 
tværkulturel forskning af selvet har været domineret af Vest (Nordamerika) versus 
Øst (Østasien) komparative undersøgelser, i høj grad inspireret af den skelsættende 
artikel af Markus og Kitayama (1991). Derimod er interne europæiske 
sammenlignende studier af selvet sjældne, og der findes på dette tidspunkt ingen 
direkte postkommunistiske og skandinaviske sammenligninger. På den anden side 
gør kapitlet opmærksom på debatten vedrørende validiteten af de nuværende 
måleredskaber af selvet, især Likert-type skalaer. Kapitlet afsluttes ved at 
præsentere Ph.d.-afhandlingens forskningsspørgsmål såvel ved at definere Ph.d.-
afhandlingens nøglebegreber. 
Kapitel 2, Teoretisk referenceramme, indledes med en bred afgrænsning af 
tværkulturel psykologi og nogle af dens centrale begreber, såsom kultur og 
individualisme-kollektivisme. Herefter giver kapitel et overblik over de mest 
fremtrædende konceptualiseringer af selvet på området: Markus og Kitayamas 
(1991) model af independent and interdependent self samt dens videreudviklinger, 
nemlig Brewer og Gardners (1996) relational and collective self og Kagitcibasis 
(2005) autonomous-related self. Til sidst præsenteres konceptualisering af selvet 
som selvbiografisk (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002; Wang, 2001). Efter et sprogligt og 
grafisk (Figur 5) resumé af alle de tidligere præsenterede teorier fortsætter kapitlet 
ved at skitsere de mest populære metoder til at måle selv i tværkulturel psykologi. 
Her diskuteres Likert-type rating skalaer, især Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 
1994), i lyset af den omfattende kritik vedrørende deres validitet. Dernæst beskrives 
Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), som er en repræsentant for 
den åbne metodologiske tilgang. Til sidst introducerer kapitlet selvbiografiske 
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erindringer som nye måleredskaber af selvet samt nævner kort de forskellige 
tilgængeligheds-, indholds- og formskarakteristika af selvbiografiske erindringer, 
der har været anvendt i denne henseende. Kapitlet afsluttes ved en begrundelse for 
den nærværende undersøgelse. 
Kapitel 3, Metodologi, præsenterer designet af den nærværende undersøgelse. Mere 
konkret beskriver kapitlet undersøgelsens deltagere, som på baggrund af deres 
nationalitet (slovakisk, norsk og dansk) og alder (unge og ældre voksne) opdeles i 
flere undergrupper. Alle deltagere blev bedt om at beskrive sig selv via Twenty 
Statements Test samt at genkalde sig og rapportere deres selvbiografiske erindringer 
i et skriftlig spørgeskema. Særlige aspekter af dataindsamlingens procedurer 
varierede på tværs af disse undergrupper. Både selvbeskrivelser og selvbiografiske 
erindringer blev efterfølgende analyseret i forhold til deres indhold. Kapitlet sætter 
ydermere fokus på nogle af de spørgsmål, der opstod under denne kodningsproces. 
Den sidste del af Kapitel 3 vedrører etiske overvejelser. 
Kapitel 4, Resultater, præsenterer undersøgelsens resultater i form af fire 
selvstændige artikler. Som udgangspunkt er Artikel 1 et teoretisk bogkapitel, som 
giver et kortfattet overblik over tværkulturel psykologi som felt. Specifikt 
introducerer artiklen nogle af feltets nøglebegreber, nemlig kultur, værdier og 
selvet, efterfulgt af nogle af feltets hovedforskningsområder, såsom undersøgelser 
af kulturelle værdidimensioner, selvtyper, emotioner samt udviklingsmæssige 
emner. Artikel 2 er en empirisk artikel, som undersøger betydningen af tre 
interpersonelle kontekster (familie, skole og venner) for norske og slovakiske unges 
selvudvikling, nemlig hvordan den kommer til udtryk i forskellige karakteristika af 
de unges selvbiografiske erindringer om disse kontekster. Artikel 3 er også en 
empirisk artikel, der denne gang undersøger relationel og kollektiv interdependence 
i to generationer fra Slovakiet og Danmark. Til dette formål gør artiklen brug af 
Twenty Statements Test. Afslutningsvis følger Artikel 4, der udgør såvel et 
teoretisk såvel som metodisk bidrag, da denne artikel foreslår en ny tilgang til 
indholdsanalyse af selvbiografiske erindringer. 
Kapitel 5, Diskussion, diskuterer først de forhen præsenterede resultaterne fra hver 
artikel. Dernæst kombineres alle artiklernes resultater i en generel diskussion alt 
efter, om de tiltaler bestemte teoretiske eller metodiske problemstillinger eller 
vedrører undersøgelsens empiriske resultater. Mens den teoretiske diskussion 
sammenligner de anvendte konceptualiseringer af selvet, fremhæver den metodiske 
diskussion fordelene ved indholdsanalyse samt nytten af selvbiografiske erindringer 
som måleredskaber af selvet. Resultaterne af de to empiriske artikler kombineres i 
et særskilt afsnit. Endelig fremhæves Ph.d.-afhandlingens samlede bidrag, efterfulgt 
af et afsnit om dens begrænsninger og forslag til fremtidig forskning. 
Ph.d.-afhandlingen afsluttes med konkluderende kommentarer i Kapitel 6, 
Konklusion. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, cross-cultural research has documented systematic differences 
in how individuals from diverse cultures think, feel, communicate, and act. 
Traditional psychological theories, developed and tested in North American and 
West European contexts, were declared ethnocentric, and universality of various 
psychological phenomena became challenged (Triandis, 1996).  
One of key notions in psychology, the notion of self, was not an exception in this 
regard. The traditional conceptualization of self as separate, stable across time, and 
defined by internal states, such as thoughts, feelings, and motives, became 
criticized as exclusively Western. Alternative conceptualizations of self have been 
proposed, most notably by Markus and Kitayama (1991). Apart from the Western, 
so-called independent view of self, Markus and Kitayama also described the 
Eastern (i.e. East Asian) interdependent view of self. This self was seen as always 
related to other selves and thus defined by thoughts, feelings, and motives of others 
in addition to its own. Moreover, interdependent self was described as ultimately 
context-bound and thus variant across situations. 
Since the publication of Markus and Kitayama’s paper in 1991, their model of 
independent and interdependent self has been utilized and tested in numerous 
investigations across the world, thereby promoting the West-East, independence-
interdependence distinction in cross-cultural psychology. While the distinction has 
undoubtedly proven instrumental on many occasions, its routine application beyond 
the North American and East Asian contexts, that is, the contexts the model 
originally referred to, has been criticized too. Namely, a number of authors have 
argued and demonstrated that in some cases, other conceptualizations of self might 
be more appropriate. For example, inspired by socioeconomic developments in 
rural Turkey, Kagitcibasi (2005, 2007) proposed a model of autonomous-related 
self, and several other researchers suggested a further differentiation of 
interdependent self into relational and collective self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000), partly drawing on investigations of gender 
differences. Most recently, conceptualization of self as inherently autobiographical 
(Wang & Brockmeier, 2002) was put forward. Taken together, it has become clear 
that when investigating self in other than the two original contexts, the 
appropriateness of Markus and Kitayama’s model needs to be carefully examined 
against its alternatives. Otherwise, the field of cross-cultural psychology might be 
at risk of developing a new kind of ethnocentrism, this time in terms of the West-
East, independence-interdependence distinction. 
For instance, it is still rather unclear whether the notions of independent and 
interdependent self could also be instrumental for comparative research on a 
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considerably smaller scale than typically adopted in the literature. In particular, 
only a handful of investigations have focused on exclusively within-European 
comparisons (e.g. Ciochină & Faria, 2009; Pouliasi & Verkuyten, 2012) or have at 
least included more than one European sample when studying self across continents 
(e.g. Lalujee & Angelova, 1995; Santamaría, de la Mata, Hansen, & Ruiz, 2010). 
Yet, important differences could exist in how individuals across European countries 
construct their selves; if for no other reason than because of some of these countries 
belonging to former Communist as compared to non-Communist regions (Inglehart 
& Baker, 2000; van Herk & Poortinga, 2011). But could possible differences 
between such samples be described in terms of independence versus 
interdependence? 
In line with this argumentation, the current thesis aims to extend the existing 
conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology to a European context. 
More specifically, the thesis focuses on two European regions—post-Communist 
Europe and Scandinavia—and that for two reasons. First, each of the regions has a 
distinct historical and sociopolitical heritage, and thus a comparison between how 
individuals living in these regions define themselves could shed light on a broader 
set of issues, namely Communism and post-Communism (Bardi & Schwartz, 1996; 
Klicperová, Feierabend, & Hofstetter, 1997). Second, both of these regions are 
rather underrepresented in cross-cultural investigations of self and hence deserve 
attention in a field that advocates for a more universal psychology (Berry, 
Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011). 
Correspondingly, the current thesis aims to appropriate methodological tools 
for investigating self in a European context. In recent years, the validity of the 
existing measures of self has become seriously questioned (Bresnahan et al., 2005; 
Gudykunst & Lee, 2003; Levine et al., 2003). For instance, the most commonly 
used Likert-type rating scales have been criticized for being subject to different 
types of response bias (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & 
Greenholtz, 2002; Kam, Zhou, Zhang, & Ho, 2012). On the other hand, open-ended 
measures, such as the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and 
autobiographical memories (Wang, 2001, 2004), have been utilized as alternatives, 
yet not without problems. Taking into account the particular context of the current 
study, the relevance of the available methods for gauging self needs to be critically 
examined, and if necessary, new methodological tools or procedures need to be 
developed. 
Taken together, the current thesis is built around the following research question:  
From the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, how can self be measured in a 
European context? More concretely, how can the predominant theories and 
methods of the field be applied to compare selves of individuals living in post-
Communist Europe and Scandinavia? 
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1.1. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
In the current thesis, the terms self, self-concept, and self-construal are used 
interchangeably. Broadly, self-concept refers to “the ways individuals internally 
conceptualize who they are” (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013, p. 825), that is, to 
individuals’ conceptual representations of themselves (Wang, 2006a). Self-
construal, a key term in cross-cultural psychology, describes “how individuals 
define and make meaning of the self”, specifically “how they see the self in relation 
to others” (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011, p. 143). Self-construal can thus 
be understood as a particular aspect of self-concept (Levine et al., 2003), namely 
“the degree to which they [individuals] see themselves as separate from others or as 
connected with others” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 226). Hence, the current 
thesis uses the term self to refer to a set of beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings about oneself (Leary & Tangney, 2003), placing a special emphasis on the 
inclusion of others therein. 
Values are “trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in the life of a person or group” (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 664). In cross-
cultural psychology, values have been understood both as properties of individuals 
and of collectives (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Hofstede, 2001) and have thus been 
investigated as both individual- as well as societal-level phenomena (Schwartz, 
1992). 
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Cross-cultural psychology, sometimes also referred to as cultural psychology (e.g. 
Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; del Prado et al., 2007; Kanagawa, Cross, & 
Markus, 2001) or culture-comparative psychology (Berry et al., 2011), is the study 
of similarities and differences in psychological processes across cultures. Even 
though the historical roots of cross-cultural psychology can be traced well beyond 
the 20th century, the discipline has become institutionalized only around the 1960s 
(Jahoda & Krewer, 1997). In a broad sense, cross-cultural psychology emerged out 
of dissatisfaction with the mainstream psychology at the time, namely with how 
little attention it had been paying to the influence of culture on individual. A 
growing number of studies were documenting profound and systematic differences 
in psychological processes across cultures, and this variation needed to be taken 
into account and explained. Therefore, the aim of cross-cultural psychology has 
become to contribute to a more universal psychology (Berry et al., 2011; H. 
Triandis, 1996); i.e. a psychology that would be applicable beyond the traditionally 
well-researched Western cultures. 
Today, cross-cultural psychology is a flourishing and highly diversified field; some 
overgeneralization may therefore be necessary in order to describe it in broad 
terms. Still, as the name already suggests, cross-cultural psychology spans across 
cultures and is comparative in nature. Cross-cultural studies usually employ two or 
more samples from divergent cultural backgrounds and aim to determine their 
possible similarities and differences with regards to a particular psychological 
phenomenon. Here, “the avowed object is to discover the causes of such cultural 
differences as may be encountered, and to tease out the universal psychological 
features underlying such surface differences” (Jahoda & Krewer, 1997, p. 28). For 
this purpose, the studies typically employ established methodological procedures 
and generally rely on quantitative methodology (Greenfield, 2000; K. D. Keith, 
2011). On the whole, the comparative character of cross-cultural psychology 
clearly presupposes that comparisons between culturally divergent populations are 
possible and meaningful. Hence, the field is “rooted in the idea of universality of 
psychic functioning” (Berry et al., 2011, p. 12), that is, it assumes that some of the 
underlying psychological processes could be common for all humans, even though 
their manifestations might be different (U. Kim, 2000). 
The key term of cross-cultural psychology is naturally culture. However, providing 
a clear and coherent definition of the term has been a challenging task, at least 
based on a recent review by Jahoda (2012). Having inspected definitions of culture 
offered by selected textbooks and texts of cross-cultural psychology, the author was 
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surprised to find how vague and mutually incompatible they were. At the same 
time, Jahoda noted that some authors of these definitions had argued that theirs was 
the “right one” and even proceeded to establish it empirically. This, according to 
Jahoda, showed “the extraordinary malleability of the construct ‘culture’” and that 
“’culture’ is not a thing, but a social construct vaguely referring to a vastly complex 
set of phenomena” (pp. 299–300). The author then suggested simply using the term 
culture without necessarily defining it, or alternatively, defining it in relation to the 
particular context the term is being used in. 
In the context of the current thesis, culture is seen as consisting of “shared elements 
that provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, 
and acting among those who share a language, a historic period, and a geographic 
location” (H. Triandis, 1996, p. 408). Brewer and Chen (2007) further specify: 
Cultures provide group members with answers to fundamental 
questions, including questions of self and identity (Who am I, or Who 
are we?), questions about how the physical and social world works and 
how things are interrelated (beliefs), and questions about how things 
should be and what is the right course of behaviour (values). (p. 139). 
Both definitions implicitly suggest that culture exists “out there”, externally to the 
individual, but also that the individual can somehow appropriate or internalize it. 
Internalized cultural constructs like the individual’s self, beliefs, and values, are 
fundamentally shaped by culture and are in a sense manifestations of culture at the 
individual level (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). Yet, it has 
been argued that by aggregating data on these individual-level constructs in a large 
sample from the same culture, characteristics of culture at the higher-order, societal 
(ecological, national, country-, population-) level can be established too. For 
instance, Schwartz (1994) stated that even though culture-level values cannot be 
observed directly, they can be inferred from averaged individual values held by 
members of that particular culture. 
In this understanding, culture is a mental entity shared by a group of individuals 
and thus, such groups of individuals have to be identified in order to study culture, 
whether at the individual or societal level. For this purpose, cross-cultural research 
has traditionally relied on individual’s country of origin as a proxy for culture. 
Here, participant samples have been chosen and compared on the basis of their 
nationality, for example, American versus Chinese. However, this tradition was 
recently challenged by Fischer and Schwartz (2011). Having re-analysed data sets 
of three large-scale value surveys, the authors found that the endorsement of 
cultural values by individuals within countries varied much more than between 
countries, that is, that the within-country value consensus was in fact very low. 
Fischer and Schwartz (2011) argued that “social institutions and other macrolevel 
variables influence the modal importance of individuals’ values within societies, 
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but individuals internalize the modal values to different extents. Segments of the 
population emphasize different values because they have different experiences and 
interests” (p. 1137). On the other hand, in different analyses, Minkov and Hofstede 
(2012, 2014) showed that in-country regions of Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, the Anglo world as well as Europe did tend to group into national clusters 
on World Values Survey and European Social Survey items. Contrary to the results 
of Fischer and Schwartz, Minkov and Hofstede’s analyses then substantiated 
nationality as a meaningful variable for culture-comparative research: 
Regardless of the internal cultural homogeneity or heterogeneity of the 
in-country regions, we . . . have to accept that the invisible force that 
groups together the regions of one nation and separates them from those 
of other nations is national culture. (Minkov & Hofstede, 2012, p. 136) 
Another prominent cross-cultural researcher, Patricia Greenfield (2013) also 
pointed out that countries might comprise culturally heterogeneous populations. 
More specifically, she argued that this heterogeneity stemmed from within-country 
variability in sociodemographics, such as education or wealth. In other words, 
members of different socioeconomic strata within a country, for example, with 
different levels of education, would hold different cultural values. Therefore, 
Greenfield recommended, cross-cultural researchers should utilize these strata, 
rather than whole nations or countries, as group units of analysis in their 
investigations (Greenfield, 2013). 
By emphasizing the role of sociodemographic factors, Greenfield (2009; 
Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003) can be seen as a link between cross-
cultural psychology and one of its neighbouring disciplines, socioecological 
psychology. In short, socioecological psychology investigates how social ecology 
shapes the individual’s mind and behaviour, with social ecology referring to both 
physical and human environment that constitutes people’s habitat (Oishi & 
Graham, 2010). More concretely, social ecology comprises macrostructures, such 
as economic, political, religious, and educational systems, as well as geography, 
climate, or housing. As illustrated in Figure 1, socioecological psychology then 
complements cross-cultural psychology by focusing on objective environmental 
factors and their influence on the individual. While a more detailed description of 
socioecological psychology lies beyond the scope of the current thesis, the 
discipline provides some important insights for cross-cultural psychology in general 
and for the current thesis in particular. Namely, even though individuals of the 
same nationality can be argued to share the same culture (Minkov & Hofstede, 
2012, 2014), it is crucial to bear in mind that these individuals also share the same 
socioecological environment; for instance, a political system. This is especially 
relevant for studies comparing groups of participants who have experienced vastly 
different political realities, such as Communism and democracy. These types of 
experiences have been shown to profoundly influence individual values (Bardi & 
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Schwartz, 1996; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; van Herk & Poortinga, 2011). Moreover, 
sociodemographic factors need to be taken into consideration in cross-cultural 
investigations, as argued by Greenfield and also demonstrated empirically. For 
instance, an association between different levels of formal education and particular 
types of values and self has been found in previous research (de la Mata, 
Santamaría, Hansen, Ruiz, & Ruiz, 2011; de la Mata & Santamaría, 2010; Dost-
Gözkan & Küntay, 2014; Greenfield, 2009; Santamaría, de la Mata, & Ruiz, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between socioecological and cross-cultural psychology. Adapted 
from “Social Ecology: Lost and Found in Psychological Science,” by S. Oishi and J. 
Graham, 2010, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, p. 357. Copyright 2010 by Sage 
Publications Inc. Adapted with permission.  
Therefore, socioecological factors are incorporated in the thesis’s theoretical 
framework, schematically represented in Figure 2. Here, the factors are shown to 
influence culture, which in turn is seen as fundamentally shaping the individual’s 
values, beliefs, and self. While the socioecological factors will be introduced in 
more detail in Chapter 3, the following section describes the most prominent way 
of describing culture in cross-cultural psychology, namely the cultural dimension of 
individualism-collectivism.  
Socioecological 
psychology 
Social ecology 
Culture Human mind 
and behaviour 
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of the thesis’ theoretical framework. Inspired by Figure 
1 in “Social Ecology: Lost and Found in Psychological Science,” by S. Oishi and J. 
Graham, 2010, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, p. 357, and Figure 2 in “Linking 
Social Change and Developmental Change: Shifting Pathways of Human Development,” by 
P. Greenfield, 2009, Developmental Psychology, 45, p. 403. 
2.1. INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM: DESCRIBING CULTURE 
AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL 
Whether a culture is shared by a group of individuals of the same nationality or 
educational background, something about this culture should explain how this 
group of individuals differs from other groups of individuals, that is, members of 
other cultures (Hofstede, 2001). In order to describe this something from a culture-
comparative perspective, cross-cultural researchers have developed “meaningful 
and relevant dimensions of cultural variability” (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006, p. 234), 
that is, cultural dimensions. Cultural dimensions characterize cultures relatively to 
each other, ordering them on a continuum from high to low. As culture is a 
theoretically multifaceted phenomenon, various cultural dimensions have been 
identified. By far the most popular cultural dimension is the one of individualism-
collectivism. Hofstede (1984), who introduced this dimension to psychology, 
defined it as follows: 
Individualism stands for a preference for a loosely knit social 
framework in society wherein individuals are supposed to take care of 
themselves and their immediate families only. Its opposite, 
Collectivism, stands for a preference for a tightly knit social framework 
in which individuals can expect their relatives, clan, or other in-group to 
look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty . . . The 
fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among individuals. It relates to 
people's self-concept: “I” or “we”. (p. 83) 
The definition conveys a few important characteristics of this cultural dimension. 
First of all, individualism and collectivism are cultural attributes, that is, they 
describe culture at the societal and not the individual level. This is how they are 
understood in the current thesis too, even though the quite common use of terms 
individualists and collectivists in the literature, referring to people who live in 
Culture Values, 
beliefs, self 
Social ecology 
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individualist and collectivist cultures, respectively, could easily suggest otherwise1. 
Second, individualism and collectivism stand on the opposite sides of a single 
continuum and are thus incompatible with each other. Finally, and most relevant to 
the current thesis, people who live in an individualist, as compared to a collectivist 
culture, are more likely to define themselves in terms of I as compared to we. 
A similar link between individualism and collectivism on the one hand and self on 
the other is apparent in Triandis’ (1996) description of individualism and 
collectivism along four distinct attributes summarized in Table 1. The first attribute 
relates to whether a particular culture employs individual or collective as its 
primary unit, resulting in this culture valuing independence over interdependence, 
and vice versa. The second attribute concerns goals. In collectivist cultures, 
individual’s goals are typically in agreement with the goals of his or her in-group, 
and in case they are not, individual will prioritize in-group goals over his or her 
own; the opposite will be the case in individualist cultures. The third attribute 
describes whether individual’s behaviour is in a particular culture seen more as a 
function of norms or of attitudes. Finally, the fourth attribute highlights that in 
collectivist cultures, relationships are evaluated based on how desirable they are for 
the in-group, while in individualist cultures, relationships are evaluated based on 
how advantageous or costly they are for the individual. 
 Individualism Collectivism 
The meaning of the self Individual as a unit of 
analysis 
Collective as a unit of 
analysis 
The structure of goals Priority of individual 
goals  
Priority of collective 
goals 
Determinants of 
behaviour  
Attitudes rather than 
norms 
Norms rather than 
attitudes  
Type of relationships Exchange relationships Communal relationships 
Table 1. Description of individualism and collectivism based on Triandis (1996). 
While the above definitions of individualism-collectivism do mention self, this 
societal-level dimension as such cannot be used to study an individual-level 
                                                            
1 In fact, such application of a higher-order construct, for example individualism, to a lower, 
individual level, is in the literature referred to as a construct-disaggregation fallacy (van de 
Vijver et al., 2008).  
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construct. For this purpose, the model of independent and interdependent self by 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) was put forward instead. 
2.2. INDEPENDENCE-INTERDEPENDENCE: DESCRIBING 
CULTURE AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
The model of independent and interdependent self by American Hazel Markus and 
Japanese Shinobu Kitayama was inspired by the authors’ personal experience with 
each other’s native culture (Markus & Kitayama, 2003). Indeed, most of the studies 
cited in their seminal paper “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) feature data from the 
United States and Japan, with the latter occasionally alternated by China, India, 
Hong Kong, or Taiwan. Hence, the distinction between independent and 
interdependent self has been in the cross-cultural literature often associated with the 
United States on the one hand and East Asia on the other, and even more broadly, 
with the demarcation between West and East. Precisely which geographical areas 
West and East according to Markus and Kitayama (1991) refer to is however not 
entirely clear in. While on page 226, the authors only briefly mention that more 
individuals in Western than in non-Western cultures would hold an independent 
view of self, on another page, they specify that the independent view of self is: 
Most clearly exemplified in some sizable segment of American culture, 
as well as in many Western European cultures. The interdependent view 
is exemplified in Japanese culture as well as in other Asian cultures. But 
it is also characteristic of African cultures, Latin-American cultures, and 
many southern European cultures. (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 225) 
Nevertheless, this stance presupposes that, put simply, living in a Western culture 
leads its members to adopt an independent view of self, while living in a non-
Western culture leads its members to adopt an interdependent view of self. An 
individual with an independent view of self sees himself or herself as independent 
and separate from even his or her closest others. Hence, this individual’s behaviour 
is mainly organized by what he or she thinks, feels, and believes rather than what 
others around him or her think, feel, believe, or do. Furthermore, an individual with 
an independent view of self sees himself or herself as a unique person, and 
expression of this uniqueness is important for him or her (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). In contrast, an individual with an interdependent view of self sees himself or 
herself as ultimately interdependent with and connected to others, and thus, this 
individual’s behaviour is mainly organized by thoughts, feelings, and actions of 
other people. Moreover, in order to ensure fitting in and connecting with others in 
all situations, this individual sees his or her defining characteristics as context-
dependent and thus regulable rather than stable across contexts (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). 
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Figure 3. The structure of the 
independent and interdependent self. 
Reprinted from “Cultures and Selves: A 
Cycle of Mutual Constitution,” by H. 
Markus and S. Kitayama, 2010, 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
5, p. 424. Copyright 2010 by Sage 
Publications Inc. Reprinted with 
permission. 
Figure 3 graphically highlights the 
differences between the two types of 
self. While the independent self is 
here displayed as having clear 
boundaries, indicated with a solid 
line, the interdependent self is seen 
as permeable, suggested by the 
dotted line. Additionally, even 
though both types of self are shown 
as belonging to in-groups, the in-
group’s dotted line in the top part of 
the figure illustrates that independent 
individuals enter and leave their 
groups more easily than 
interdependent individuals; these are 
instead relatively bound by them 
(Markus & Kitayama, 2010). 
Importantly, Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that the two types of self could 
be used as explanatory constructs for cross-cultural differences in psychological 
processes, such as cognition, emotion, and motivation. For example, the authors 
referred to a study, in which Indian and American adults were asked to describe 
two prosocial and two deviant behaviours, as well as to explain why such 
behaviours would be undertaken (Miller, 1984). These explanations were then 
coded for dispositional and situational references, revealing that Americans used 
significantly more dispositional explanations than Indians, while Indians used 
significantly more situational explanations than Americans. Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) interpreted these results as evidence for the American participants holding 
an independent and Indian participants an interdependent view of self, respectively. 
Since the publication of the 1991 paper, numerous investigations have utilized the 
model of independent and interdependent self (for a review, see Cross et al., 2011), 
thereby making it exceptionally popular in the field of cross-cultural psychology 
(Berry et al., 2011). Nevertheless, a considerable amount of critique has been raised 
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against the model as well, and that on various grounds. Some of this critique and 
the refinements that followed it are outlined in the next section. 
2.3. CRITIQUE AND REFINEMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE-
INTERDEPENDENCE 
Some of the critical points that have been directed at Markus and Kitayama’s model 
of independent and interdependent self can be attributed to how these notions had 
been utilized by other researchers in the field rather than to possible fundamental 
problems with the authors’ original work. A case in point is a study by Kolstad and 
Horpestad (2009) that investigated self in Chile and Norway. Based on Hofstede's 
(1980) classification of Chile as collectivist and Norway as individualist, Kolstad 
and Horpestad hypothesized that Chileans would be interdependent and 
Norwegians independent. However, the results revealed that the Chilean sample 
was both more interdependent as well as more independent than the Norwegian 
sample. Based on these results, Kolstad and Horpestad concluded that the 
classification of Chile as collectivist and Norway as individualist had been 
inadequate and that the dichotomy of independent and interdependent self was 
unsuitable for investigation in most cultures. Instead, the authors suggested that 
each culture and each individual maintained a unique mixture of individualism-
collectivism and independence-interdependence, respectively. 
Kolstad and Horpestad’s conclusion, along with the entire study, can be challenged 
on various grounds. First, the authors confounded the individual and societal level 
of analysis, assuming that their data on independence-interdependence could 
provide an indication of the degree of individualism-collectivism in the two 
countries, and vice versa. Correspondence between these individual- and societal-
level scores has in fact been largely disputed (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Oyserman & 
Uskul, 2008; van de Vijver, van Hemert, & Poortinga, 2008) 2. Indeed, Kolstad and 
Horpestad’s study is an individual-level investigation with only two groups of 
participants, while Hofstede’s study featured responses of more than 117,000 
participants that were compared nation-wise. Second, the authors decided to simply 
extend Markus and Kitayama’s model to a set of novel samples without any 
precaution. Even though in their original paper, Markus and Kitayama categorized 
several cultural regions as either favouring independence or interdependence (see 
the quote in the previous section), they have also repeatedly stated that their aim 
                                                            
2 In this respect, the term ecological fallacy has been utilized to describe instances “when an 
association among nation-level variables (ecological indices) is assumed to apply to 
individuals” (Bond, 2002, p. 75); for example, when a country’s high score on individualism 
is used to predict high independence in a population sample from the country. Reverse 
ecological fallacy refers to the same inference, only in the opposite direction. 
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was not to describe the two only possible types of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 
2003): 
Our goal was and still is to describe at least one other way of being. To 
this end, we used being in East Asian contexts because we knew 
something about it. The point of this comparison was not to describe 
two fixed and separate ways of being or to suggest that people 
everywhere had either an independent or an interdependent sense of 
self. Our point was simply to suggest that if there was at least one other 
mode of being, then the one that we knew well in European American 
contexts was not "the human way" to be, but instead a way of being that 
emerges primarily in middle-class European American contexts, and 
one that bears the stamp of Western individualism with its particular 
normative models of human nature and how to be a self. (Markus & 
Kitayama, 2003, p. 282) 
Hence, having alternated between somewhat contradictory positions, Markus and 
Kitayama can be seen as partly responsible for the fact that many researchers, 
Kolstad and Horpestad (2009) among them, had routinely extended the model of 
independent and interdependent self to numerous and fairly diverse cultural 
contexts. The above citation as well as the surprising results of the Chilean-
Norwegian study indicate that such extensions are rather problematic. 
A more systematic critique of the model of independent and interdependent self 
came from David Matsumoto (1999). Matsumoto decided to assess the empirical 
evidence behind the model by reviewing studies that Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
themselves referred to as well as a few other relevant investigations of his own 
choice. Matsumoto wanted to specifically verify whether in the reviewed studies, 
independent and interdependent self really served as explanatory constructs for 
cross-cultural differences in cognition, emotion, and motivation, as the authors had 
originally claimed. However, he discovered instead that in most of the 
investigations, the particular type of self was not even measured, but just 
automatically assumed based on participant’s nationality; for example, American – 
independent; Japanese, Chinese, Indian, etc. – interdependent. Matsumoto later 
referred to this phenomenon as the cultural attribution fallacy, that is, “the inference 
that something ‘cultural’ about the groups being compared produced the observed 
differences when there is no empirical justification for this inference” (Matsumoto 
& Yoo, 2006, p. 235). Matsumoto’s point and in particular the cultural attribution 
fallacy can be illustrated by a study from Varnum and colleagues (Varnum, 
Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 2008). Relevant to the current thesis, 
the study compared Western and Eastern Europeans, and that with respect to their 
performance in a set of cognitive tasks, such as categorization (Study 1), change 
blindness, and the framed line test (Study 2). The authors hypothesized Western 
Europeans to be independent and thus to employ a more analytic cognitive style, 
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that is, to categorize thematically rather than relationally, to detect focal rather than 
contextual changes, and to be more accurate in replicating absolute rather than 
proportional length. The opposite was expected of Eastern Europeans, as these were 
hypothesized to be interdependent, and thus to employ a more holistic cognitive 
style. Even though the results largely supported the expected differences in 
cognitive performance, the role of independent and interdependent self in causing 
these differences was not empirically established. Hence, both Markus and 
Kitayama as well as many authors adhering to their model have been guilty of not 
always verifying the hypothesized cross-cultural variation in self. 
To summarize, it is possible to distinguish between two types of critique raised 
against Markus and Kitayama’s model of independent and interdependent self. The 
first type of critique is due to the inaccurate interpretation and/or application of the 
model by other researchers. This can be evidenced in the model’s routine extension 
to almost any cultural context, in the frequent inference of individual-level 
independence-interdependence from societal-level scores on individualism-
collectivism and vice versa, and in the frequent absence of the actual measurement 
of independent and interdependent self. The second type of critique pertains to the 
model per se, more specifically to its weak empirical evidence and to the ambiguity 
regarding the scope of its application. In an attempt to resolve these issues, both 
theoretical and methodological arguments have been put forward. The theoretical 
refinements of the model will be outlined in subsequent sections, while the 
methodological arguments, relating to the use of Likert-type rating scales, will be 
addressed in section 2.4.1. of this chapter. 
2.3.1. VARIOUS FACETS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
As a matter of fact, most conceptual refinements of the model of independent and 
interdependent self have focused on the latter, that is, the notion of 
interdependence. For instance, Hashimoto and Yamagishi (2013; see also Gungor, 
Karasawa, Boiger, Dincer, & Mesquita, 2014) suggested that interdependence 
encompassed two distinct aspects, namely harmony seeking and rejection 
avoidance. Harmony seeking was described as a voluntary strategy of 
interdependent individuals, which can be evidenced in their continuous wish to 
adapt to and fit in their social environment. The authors argued that harmony 
seeking was to some extent important for adaptation in all cultures and hence could 
not reliably differentiate between people with independent and interdependent self. 
In this sense, the exclusive focus on harmony seeking in previous research could 
help explain the weak empirical evidence for Markus and Kitayama’s model 
(Hashimoto & Yamagishi, 2013). In contrast, rejection avoidance was characterized 
as a social constraint experienced particularly by interdependent individuals in 
collectivist societies, and that because of the individuals’ high dependence on their 
close circles and thus their very small freedom to leave these circles. Hashimoto 
and Yamagishi’s Study 3 supported this argumentation, having found no 
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differences in the degree of harmony seeking between Japanese and Americans, but 
higher scores of rejection avoidance among the Japanese. 
Instead of distinguishing between distinct ways of being interdependent, other 
authors have identified different kinds of others an individual can be interdependent 
with. Most notably, Brewer and Gardner (1996) made a distinction between being 
interdependent with specific others and being interdependent with members of 
larger, impersonal collectives or social categories. While the former, termed 
relational self, would be based on common bonds, the latter, called collective self, 
would be based on common identity. In line with this distinction, Brewer and 
colleagues (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; but see E. Kashima & 
Hardie, 2000 for a different interpretation) suggested that Markus and Kitayama's 
(1991) interdependent self corresponded to relational but not collective self. 
Consequently, the weak empirical evidence for the model could once again be 
attributed to the ambiguous conceptualization of interdependence in the past, this 
time with regards to a missing differentiation between relational and collective self. 
In order to provide empirical support for this claim, Brewer and Chen (2007) 
content analysed 21 scales measuring independence and interdependence3. The 
authors discovered that 36% of items across all scales referred to specific 
relationships, while only 12% mentioned group memberships. Moreover, no items 
addressed a possible trade-off between relational and collective interdependence, 
suggesting “an implicit assumption in the existing literature that relational 
orientations and group/collective orientations are essentially equivalent or 
compatible” (Brewer & Chen, 2007, p. 136). Hence, the authors concluded that 
cross-cultural literature had traditionally emphasized specific interpersonal 
relationships rather than large, impersonal collectives as the context for 
interdependence; yet, it has done so without explicitly distinguishing between the 
two. 
If Markus and Kitayama’s interdependent self corresponded to relational self, this 
would imply that Japanese and other East Asians were relational- rather than 
collective-interdependent. But would it also imply that East Asians did not define 
themselves as group members? Not according to Yuki (2003), who proposed that 
East Asians saw their in-groups as complex networks of interrelated members and 
not as depersonalized entities; this was a traditionally Western view. Yuki’s 
proposition was indirectly supported by a series of studies on depersonalized trust 
in Japanese and Americans (Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005), in which 
                                                            
3 Brewer and Chen (2007) used the terms individualism and collectivism as psychological, 
individual-level attributes, while in the current thesis, these terms are understood as societal-
level constructs only (see section 2.1.). Therefore, for the sake of consistency, the terms are 
substituted by independence and interdependence, respectively, when describing Brewer and 
Chen’s study.   
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Americans were found to trust strangers based on a shared category membership 
(e.g. attended university), while Japanese trusted strangers based on the likelihood 
of sharing direct or indirect interpersonal links with them. Brewer and Chen 
summarized: 
People in all cultures favour their in-groups over their out-groups to a 
similar extent; what differs across cultures is the meaning of in-groups 
versus out-groups and the basis of psychological attachment to the in-
group. Whereas the meaning of in-groups in many so-called 
collectivistic cultures refers to direct versus indirect relationships or 
relational networks (e.g., friends from the same college), the meaning of 
in-groups in individualistic cultures refers to a categorical membership 
distinction between one’s group and other groups. (2007, p. 147). 
Following this argumentation, people living in collectivist cultures would be 
expected to maintain a more salient relational self, while people in individualist 
cultures would be assumed to be more collective. This might sound 
counterintuitive, but as Brewer and Yuki (2007) pointed out, collective self, 
concerned with abstract, categorical memberships (e.g. student), was compatible 
with the type of independence promoted in individualist cultures. 
Interestingly, the exact opposite pattern was hypothesized by Cross, Bacon and 
Morris (2000), who similarly to Brewer and colleagues emphasized the distinction 
between relational and collective self, both theoretically and in measurement (see 
also Cross et al., 2011; Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002). More concretely, the authors 
argued that Americans, that is, members of a prototypically individualist culture, 
were more likely to include close relationships rather than in-groups in their self. 
This was because group memberships were in individualist cultures seen as rather 
unimportant, casual, and voluntary; groups here generally required little loyalty and 
placed fewer demands on their members (H. Triandis, 1989). Hence, relational 
interdependence was supposed to be characteristic of American populations and 
collective interdependence of East Asian populations (Cross et al., 2000). 
Unfortunately, Cross and colleagues have yet to present data that would support 
this hypothesis; so far, their investigations have focused on differences within 
American samples only. On the other hand, these investigations have an important 
advantage over many studies referring to the theory of Markus and Kitayama 
(1991). Specifically, in contrast to these studies, Cross and colleagues have 
consistently demonstrated—not merely assumed—a link between self and various 
aspects of psychological processes. For instance, Cross, Morris and Gore (2002) 
showed that American individuals scoring higher on Relational-Interdependent 
Self-Construal scale (RISC; Cross et al., 2000) had more positive associations with 
and a more tightly organized network of relationship-oriented concepts; they also 
remembered more information about others’ relationships and when provided with 
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a relational clustering tool; and they described and perceived themselves more 
similarly to their close friend, but not to their in-group member. 
Finally, the distinction between independent, relational, and collective self has been 
in some literature paralleled to Triandis' (1989) differentiation between private, 
public, and collective self (e.g. Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Kashima et al., 1995). 
However, such parallel is not entirely fitting; in contrast to the previously stated 
definitions, Triandis’ conceptualization of public and collective self emphasized 
assessment of self by others:  
Thus, we have the following: the private self – cognitions that involve 
traits, states, or behaviours of the person (e.g., "I am introverted," "I am 
honest," "I will buy X"); the public self – cognitions concerning the 
generalized other's view of the self, such as "People think I am 
introverted" or "People think I will buy X"; and the collective self – 
cognitions concerning a view of the self that is found in some collective 
(e.g., family, coworkers, tribe, scientific society); for instance, "My 
family thinks I am introverted" or "My coworkers believe I travel too 
much." (H. Triandis, 1989, p. 507) 
Moreover, Triandis has not been very clear nor consistent in applying this 
conceptualization; for instance, he provided only a sketchy characterization of 
public self (H. Triandis, 1989) and later altered the original definition of collective 
self (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). These could be some of the reasons why 
his distinction has received only limited attention in the field (Cross et al., 2011). 
Other refinements of interdependence that similarly require further research are: the 
model of vertical-horizontal and relational-collective self (Harb & Smith, 2008), 
the Circles of Closeness (Uleman, Rhee, Bardoliwalla, Semin, & Toyama, 2000), 
and the differentiation between familism, companionship, and patriotism (Realo, 
Allik, & Vadi, 1997). 
2.3.2. AUTONOMOUS-RELATED SELF 
A more substantial modification of Markus and Kitayama’s model was put forward 
by Turkish researcher Cigdem Kagitcibasi. Kagitcibasi (2005, 2007) argued that the 
model of independent and interdependent self had been constructed from a typically 
Western, that is, North American, perspective and was thus biased. More 
concretely, she maintained that the model confounded two underlying dimensions 
of a distinct meaning; one of interpersonal distance and the other of agency. 
Interpersonal distance here referred to the extent self was separate from or related 
to others, differentiating between separateness and relatedness. Agency, on the 
other hand, described self in terms of autonomy and heteronomy (dependence). 
Conceptualizing interpersonal distance and agency as orthogonal dimensions, 
Kagitcibasi’s model permitted two types of autonomous self; namely, autonomous-
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separate self and autonomous-related self (see Figure 4). While the former 
corresponded to Markus and Kitayama's (1991) independent self, the latter 
combined autonomy with relatedness, that is, characteristics that had been in many 
Western psychological theories considered incompatible. 
Kagitcibasi’s proposal of autonomous-related self was inspired by results of a nine-
country research project as well as its subsequent ten-country follow-up, both of 
which investigated values of children (for more information, see Kagitcibasi, 2007). 
In short, the results showed that a profound family change was taking place in 
collectivist cultures, such as rural areas of Turkey. More concretely, because of 
increasing urbanization and socioeconomic development, parents living in these 
areas were beginning to value children’s autonomy alongside the traditionally 
emphasized relatedness between them and their children. At the same time, children 
were becoming more economically autonomous from their parents, while 
remaining psychologically related to them. This way, autonomy and relatedness 
became endorsed simultaneously in these families (Kagitcibasi, 2007).  
 
Figure 4. Agency and interpersonal distance – two distinct dimensions. Reprinted from 
“Adolescent Autonomy-Relatedness and the Family in Cultural Context: What Is Optimal?” 
by C. Kagitcibasi, 2013, Journal of Research on Adolescence, 23, p. 225. Copyright 2013 by 
Cigdem Kagitcibasi. Reprinted with permission.  
Even though autonomous-related self had supposedly emerged in and was most 
typical for rapidly developing collectivist cultures, Kagitcibasi maintained that “any 
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family context that satisfies and reinforces these two needs [autonomy and 
relatedness] would be expected to result in this type of self-development” 
(Kagitcibasi, 2007, p. 186). Moreover, the author regarded autonomy and 
relatedness as two fundamental human needs and autonomous-related self as 
psychologically most optimal from all possible types of self (Kagitcibasi, 2005, 
2007, 2013). 
As shortly mentioned above, the research behind the model of autonomous-related 
self addressed issues critical to developmental psychology. Not surprisingly then, 
majority of investigations utilizing the model has kept a similar focus. In one study, 
94 Brazilian mothers were asked to describe their children, who were between 17 to 
22 months old at that time, in an interview (Seidl-de-Moura et al., 2013). The 
mothers’ descriptions were coded into various categories, such as autonomy and 
relatedness4. For the whole sample, the proportion of descriptions in these two 
categories was equally high, suggesting that the Brazilian mothers valued both 
autonomy and relatedness in their children (Seidl-de-Moura et al., 2013). Other 
authors have examined parental ethnotheories, that is, “culture-specific theories of 
child development” (Greenfield, 2009, p. 404). For instance, Kärtner and 
colleagues (Kärtner et al., 2007) used a picture-based interview technique and a 
questionnaire on socialization goals to compare the importance of autonomy and 
relatedness in German, American, Indian, and Cameroonian mothers. The results 
showed that German, American, Indian and urban Cameroonian mothers valued 
autonomous socialization goals more than rural Cameroonian mothers, while at the 
same time, both Cameroonian samples valued relational socialization goals more 
than the other groups. Moreover, a similar yet slightly less pronounced pattern of 
results emerged when the mothers’ responses during interviews were coded for 
various indicators of autonomy and relatedness. Taken together, the importance of 
autonomy and relatedness regarding child care in the study depended on whether 
the mothers came from an urban, middle-class, highly educated background or not, 
and whether they lived in developed or developing societies, that is, exactly on 
those variables that Kagitcibasi’s model of family change would have predicted. 
What both of the aforementioned studies exemplify is that most researchers 
referring to Kagitcibasi’s work have in fact not investigated self directly, since they 
have not measured it. This can also be evidenced in the limited amount of 
investigations that have included Kagitcibasi's (2007) Autonomy-Relatedness Scale 
(ARS) in their designs (e.g. Celenk, van de Vijver, & Goodwin, 2011; Dost-Gözkan 
& Küntay, 2014). Instead, the focus has been on values embedded in parental 
ethnotheories, practices, or socialization goals. In these inquiries, autonomy and 
                                                            
4 The authors use the terms autonomy and relatedness interchangeably with independence 
and interdependence, which is odd, as that essentially disregards Kagitcibasi’s main 
argument.  
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relatedness have only been assumed; moreover, they have been assumed in the 
children of the investigated participants rather than in the participants themselves. 
Hence, direct empirical evidence for the existence of autonomous-related self 
appears rather scarce; on the other hand, Kagitcibasi’s model of family change as 
such has been well documented (Kagitcibasi, 2007). 
 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
 
c) 
Figure 5. Theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence (in bold) behind the 
conceptualizations of self as: a) independent and interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991), b) relational and collective (Cross et al., 2000), and c) autonomous-related 
(Kagitcibasi, 2005).  
All in all, self in cross-cultural psychology has been conceptualized in terms of 
independence and interdependence, relational and collective interdependence, and 
autonomy and relatedness. More concretely, Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
proposed independent and interdependent self as explanatory constructs for cross-
cultural differences in cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes; yet, most 
studies adhering to this model have only documented the differences rather than the 
link between them and the two types of self (see Matsumoto, 1999). Second, Cross 
and colleagues similarly maintained that self, namely relational self, was associated 
with individual variation in various psychological processes and demonstrated this 
association in a number of investigations (Cross et al., 2000, 2002; Cross & 
Madson, 1997). However, these investigations featured North American 
populations only; cross-cultural applicability of their results is therefore limited. 
Culture Self Psych. 
process. 
Cultural 
models 
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Finally, Kagitcibasi (2005, 2007, 2013) described autonomous-related self within 
her model of family change, mostly referring to traditionally collectivist, now 
rapidly developing, cultures. The subsequent line of research has mainly focused on 
parents from these cultures and specifically on documenting the appraisal of 
autonomy and relatedness in their parenting ideas and practices (e.g. Kärtner et al., 
2007; Seidl-de-Moura et al., 2013). Taken together, all three conceptualizations of 
self can be seen as parts of broader frameworks for describing culture’s influence 
on the individual, with each focusing on different aspects of this influence (see 
Figure 5). This way, it is also possible to note the available evidence for these 
frameworks (emphasized in bold) as well as its possible lack. Hence, in order to 
further nuance the understanding of the links between social ecology, culture, and 
self (see Figure 2), an additional conceptualization of self is presented in the next 
section, namely of self as inherently autobiographical. This conceptualization has 
inspired an important, separate line of cross-cultural research by offering a novel 
instrument for gauging self: individual’s autobiographical memories. 
2.3.3. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SELF 
Autobiographical memories are memories of ”significant personal experiences 
from an individual’s life” (Wang, 2008, p. 744). Indeed, not all memories of 
individual’s personal past qualify as autobiographical, as that would require them to 
be especially self-relevant. This defining characteristic of autobiographical 
memories makes them central to the understanding of self, as noted by a number of 
authors across diverse psychological disciplines. For instance, within cognitive 
psychology, the so-called self-memory system model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway, 2005) described how autobiographical memories ground self, that 
is, constrain what self has been, can be, and might become. In a similar fashion, the 
study of self-functions of autobiographical memories has pointed to these memories 
as important tools for maintenance of self-continuity, self-coherence, and self-
enhancement over time (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Wilson & Ross, 
2003). Furthermore, personality psychologist Dan P. McAdams (2001) argued that 
autobiographical memories help individual to actively construct an integrative life 
story. In general then, self and autobiographical memories have been understood as 
two closely interrelated phenomena. 
From the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, individual’s self as well as 
individual’s autobiographical memories are seen as ultimately embedded in culture 
(see Figure 6) and as particularly influenced by two macro-level characteristics of 
culture: the predominant cultural conceptions of selfhood and the perceived 
importance of autobiographical remembering (Röttger-Rössler, 1993; Wang & 
Brockmeier, 2002; Wang, 2001, 2006b). More concretely, it is proposed that some 
cultures promote a conception of independent and stable self rather than 
interdependent and context-sensitive; hence, these cultures will also tend to 
emphasize a coherent, self-focused autobiography over social aspects of memories 
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and remembering. Consequently, these macro-level characteristics of culture will 
manifest themselves in concrete micro-level cultural practices, such as family 
memory conversations (i.e. reminiscing; Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Nelson & Fivush, 
2004). For instance, when reminiscing, parents in these cultures will accentuate 
some of their children’s experiences, or some details of these experiences, and will 
thereby guide their children in interpreting and evaluating past events. This way, 
parents will communicate to their children how to remember as well as “how to be 
a ‘self’ in their culture” (Nelson & Fivush, 2004, p. 506). 
 
 Figure 6. Autobiographical memory and self embedded in culture. Reprinted from 
“Autobiographical Remembering as Cultural Practice: Understanding the Interplay between 
Memory, Self and Culture” by Q. Wang and J. Brockmeier, 2002, Culture & Psychology, 8, 
p. 51. Copyright 2002 by SAGE Publications Inc. Reprinted with permission. 
In support of the above, previous research has documented cross-cultural 
differences in both parent-child reminiscing and autobiographical memories. For 
example, American as compared to Chinese mothers have been shown to engage in 
more elaborative and more independently oriented conversations about the past 
with their children (Wang, Leichtman, & Davies, 2000). Similarly, American as 
compared to Chinese adults have been found to report longer, more specific, more 
self-focused, and more emotionally salient memories (Wang & Conway, 2004). 
Moreover, cross-cultural differences in accessibility, form, and content 
characteristics of autobiographical memories have been linked to the participants’ 
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levels of independence and interdependence (Wang, 2001), hence establishing 
autobiographical memories as novel, alternative measures of self. 
Figure 7 highlights the key elements of the framework presented in the current 
section and its empirical evidence (emphasized in bold). In short, here the focus has 
been on the closely interrelated self and autobiographical memories as well as on 
culture’s influence on these two phenomena, mainly through family reminiscing 
practices. Cross-cultural investigations inspired by this framework have in general 
shown that “autobiographical memories of people in different cultures can take on 
different forms and consist of different themes that appear to be a function of the 
ways in which the self is culturally conceived of” (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002, p. 
49). Once again however, these investigations have measured self only rarely (see 
Wang, 2001, 2004, for an exception). Nevertheless, the utility of autobiographical 
memories as measures of self has been established and is an important point for the 
current thesis. Before addressing this point in more detail in section 2.4.3, the more 
traditional approaches to measuring self in cross-cultural psychology are reviewed 
first. 
 
 
Figure 7. Theoretical framework and empirical evidence (in bold) behind the 
conceptualization of self as autobiographical and culturally shaped (e.g. Wang, 2001).  
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2.4. MEASURING SELF IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
2.4.1. LIKERT-TYPE RATING SCALES 
Likert-type rating scales are the most commonly used measures of self in cross-
cultural psychology. While some of the scales adhere to the model of independent 
and interdependent self (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Leung & Kim (1997) in Levine, 
Bresnahan, Park, Lapinski, Wittenbaum, et al., 2003; Singelis, 1994), others gauge 
relational and/or collective self (Cross et al., 2000; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Harb 
& Smith, 2008; E. Kashima & Hardie, 2000), or autonomous-related self 
(Kagitcibasi, 2007). When filling the scales out, respondents are typically asked to 
indicate the degree of their agreement with a series of statements, such as “I enjoy 
being unique and different from others” (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Leung & Kim 
(1997) in Levine, Bresnahan, Park, Lapinski, Wittenbaum, et al., 2003; Singelis, 
1994), “If a person hurts someone close to me, I feel personally hurt as well” (Cross 
et al., 2000), or  “I do not like a person to interfere with my life even if he/she is 
very close to me” (Kagitcibasi, 2007). The respondents’ agreement across all items, 
or specific groups of items, is then usually reported in the form of a mean value.  
Parallel to the reputation of Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) model as the most 
popular conceptualization of self in cross-cultural psychology, Singelis’ Self-
Construal Scale (SCS; 1994) has been described as the most widespread scale for 
measuring self cross-culturally (Cross et al., 2011; Smith, 2011). When introducing 
the scale, Singelis argued that individuals in every culture maintained both an 
independent and interdependent self, which simply became activated in different 
situations. Therefore, the author designed the SCS to measure independence and 
interdependence as two separate dimensions; the original scale included 12 items in 
each subscale5. Agreement with the items was marked on a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The scale contained no 
reverse-scored items6. 
Being the primary measurement tool for independent and interdependent self, SCS 
came under close scrutiny once the empirical evidence for Markus and Kitayama’s 
model had been dubbed weak (e.g. Matsumoto, 1999). For instance, a number of 
authors have demonstrated that SCS measures self along more than two dimensions 
and could thus suffer from low construct validity. Specifically, Guo, Schwartz, and 
McCabe (2008) found that a four-factor model of self provided a better fit for their 
                                                            
5 Other researchers have later on added various extra items to the scale, which resulted in 
multiple versions of SCS, comprising minimum 12 to maximum 16 items in each sub-scale. 
6 Inclusion of reverse-scored items “is a standard procedure to control for simple response 
styles like an acquiescence bias” (Schimmack et al., 2005, p. 21). 
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SCS data than a two-factor one; moreover, this finding held across samples of 
young and old adults, men and women as well as White and Hispanic Americans. A 
similar result was obtained in another investigation employing the 30-items-version 
of the scale (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004), only this time a six-factor instead 
of a four-factor solution was proposed. The six factors were termed 
autonomy/assertiveness, individualism, behavioural consistency, primacy of self, 
esteem for group, and relational interdependence. Next, Levine and colleagues 
(Levine et al., 2003) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of various sets of 
SCS data only to confirm the poor fit of the two-factor, independence-
interdependence model, and to instead suggest six- to seven-factor solutions. 
Finally, Grace and Cramer (2003) discovered only one additional factor of SCS 
besides independence and interdependence, which they interpreted as hierarchy. 
The possibly low construct validity of SCS has also been noted at face value. 
Levine et al. (2003) closely inspected the content of three most common scales for 
measuring independence and interdependence (including SCS) and observed that 
some of the scales’ items were concerned with behaviours linked to self, while 
other items appeared to measure other constructs, such as altruism, face, power 
distance, conformity, or communication directness. Smith (2011) further showed 
that some SCS items describe values (e.g. “It is important to me to maintain 
harmony within my group”), while other refer to behaviours (e.g. “I will stay in a 
group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group”); moreover, he 
noted that some items mention groups, while other relate to specific people. Taken 
together, there is reason to believe that SCS gauges a multidimensional rather than 
two-dimensional self and/or that it besides self also measures other, theoretically 
distinct concepts. These limitations of SCS could then partly explain the 
inconsistent empirical findings behind the model of Markus and Kitayama as well 
as the low internal and external reliability of SCS per se (Cross et al., 2011; Smith, 
2011). 
Nevertheless, SCS is not the only scale that has been subjected to critique (see 
Bresnahan et al., 2005; Levine, Bresnahan, Park, Lapinski, Wittenbaum, et al., 
2003). In fact, Likert-type rating scales in general have been shown to generate data 
contaminated by substantial response bias. Response bias refers to “a systematic 
tendency to respond in a certain way to items or scales” (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006, 
p. 244). In cross-cultural investigations, such systematic tendencies in one sample 
as compared to another may easily become misinterpreted as true differences in a 
particular variable of interest, even though they may be simply reflecting sample 
differences in response styles. Johnson and colleagues (Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & 
Shavitt, 2005) investigated two particular types of response bias across 19 cultures, 
namely extreme response bias and acquiescence bias. While the former refers to a 
tendency to select the extreme points of a scale, the latter describes a tendency to 
agree with questions or statements regardless of their content. Johnson and 
colleagues demonstrated that both types of bias were systematically associated with 
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Hofstede’s cultural dimensions; for instance, individual-level acquiescence 
behaviour was here negatively correlated with societal-level individualism. In 
another comparative study (Chen et al., 1995), representative samples of Japanese, 
Taiwanese, Canadian, and American high school students filled out a questionnaire 
about their school and daily life. The results showed that Japanese and Chinese 
students were more likely than Americans and Canadians to use the midpoint of the 
7-point Likert scale, while American students were more likely than the three other 
groups to use the scale’s extreme points. Lastly, Heine and colleagues (Heine et al., 
2002) described another type of response bias called the reference-group effect. 
Specifically, the authors suggested that because most rating scales did not instruct 
the respondent to evaluate himself or herself with reference to someone in 
particular, each respondent would instinctively choose his or her own reference 
group for self-evaluation. For instance, a Japanese respondent might compare 
himself or herself to other Japanese, while an American might compare himself or 
herself to other Americans. Here, even though the perceived standards for a 
particular characteristic such as independence might differ between the two 
reference groups, the respondents’ evaluations against these standards would be 
normally distributed in both groups alike (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). This way, the 
true sample differences in independence would become obscured, which, according 
to Heine et al., could explain the weak cross-cultural differences in independence 
and interdependence found in some investigations. 
To summarize, the utility of Likert-type rating scales for measuring self in cross-
cultural research is controversial. On the one hand, some of the commonly used 
scales, especially the SCS, appear to have questionable face validity and factor 
structure; on the other hand, cross-cultural data obtained through rating scales have 
been shown to be subject to various types of response bias. Even though response 
bias has been by some authors seen as an important expression of cultural 
characteristics (Smith, 2004), other authors have emphasized the need to control for 
it (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). Also due to these reasons, open-ended 
measures of self have been utilized as alternatives; the Twenty Statements Test is 
one of them. 
2.4.2. THE TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST 
The Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), in the literature also 
referred to as the ‘I am’ test (Bochner, 1994; Realo et al., 1997; H. Triandis, 
McCusker, & Hui, 1990) or the self-attitudes instrument (Trafimow, Silverman, 
Mei-Tai Fan, & Shui Fun Law, 1997; Trafimow et al., 1991) has a very simple 
format. Namely, the test consists of 20 empty lines starting with I am that the 
participant is instructed to fill out. Participant’s responses, so-called self-
descriptions, are subsequently analysed according to criteria chosen by the 
researcher. For instance, Kuhn and McPartland (1954), who introduced the test, 
differentiated between self-descriptions referring to consensually defined statuses 
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and classes (i.e. consensual responses, such as student or husband) and self-
descriptions that “would require interpretation by the respondent to be precise, or to 
place him relative to other people” (i.e. subconsensual responses, such as happy or 
good wife; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954, p. 69). 
While Kuhn and McPartland’s open-ended technique has emerged as a popular 
measure of self in cross-cultural psychology, the authors’ differentiation between 
consensual and subconsensual self-descriptions has stayed largely ignored by the 
field7. Instead, cross-cultural researchers have chosen to make use of the field’s 
prominent conceptualizations of self when analysing TST data. For instance, a 
number of investigations (e.g. Bochner, 1994; Dabul, Bernal, & Knight, 1995; 
Santamaría et al., 2010; but see also Eaton & Louw, 2000; Ma & Schoeneman, 
1997; Realo et al., 1997; Realo & Allik, 1999; Triandis et al., 1990) have applied a 
categorisation by Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991), which had been based on 
Triandis’ (1989) distinction between private, public, and collective self. Other 
authors (e.g. del Prado et al., 2007; Eaton & Louw, 2000; Kanagawa et al., 2001; 
Parkes, Schneider, & Bochner, 1999; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995; 
Somech, 2000) have adopted Cousins’ (1989) approach. Cousins divided self-
descriptions elicited through TST into four main categories, ranging from the most 
specific, such as physical attributes (e.g. I am tall) to the most abstract, so-called 
global descriptions (e.g. I am a human being). Subsequent studies developed this 
categorization further by combining the abstract-specific dimension with the 
dimension of independence-interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
TST has been praised for being less culturally biased than the previously reviewed 
Likert-type rating scales (Bond & Cheung, 1983), as its simple, open-ended 
response format “allows respondents to describe themselves in their own words, 
using terms that are particularly salient or accessible” (del Prado et al., 2007, p. 
1124). Yet, this format has its weaknesses too: In order for results to be comparable 
across TST studies, precise and consistent definitions of coding criteria as well as 
corresponding theoretical concepts are necessary. Unfortunately, precision and 
consistency has been maintained only rarely in this respect. To illustrate, the 
aforementioned Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto’s (1991) operationalization appears 
to correspond more to the conceptualization of self as private, relational, and 
collective rather than to Triandis’ distinction between private, public, and collective 
self, as originally intended. This is due to two reasons. First, as noted previously 
(see section 2.3.1.), Triandis’ original definition of collective self was later 
modified, namely, it changed from incorporating assessment of self by others (e.g. 
                                                            
7 Although a few studies (e.g. Bond & Cheung, 1983; Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, Thapa, & 
Rettek, 1995; Driver, 1969) did employ Kuhn's (1960) later proposal of in total five 
categories;  these distinguished between participant’s references to social groups and 
classifications, ideological beliefs, interests, ambitions, and self-evaluations.  
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My family thinks I am introverted; Triandis, 1989, p. 507) to simply referring to 
group memberships (e.g. I am a son; Trafimow et al., 1991, p. 649). Second, 
Trafimow et al.’s operationalization of public self in the form of so-called 
allocentric self-descriptions appears imprecise. Specifically, while public self had 
been originally defined as generalized other’s view of self (e.g. People think I’m 
introverted; Triandis, 1989, p. 507), allocentric self-descriptions were instead to 
concern “a quality of interdependence, friendship, responsiveness to others, and 
sensitivity to the viewpoints of others . . . [e.g.] ‘I am a person who wants to help 
others’” (Trafimow et al., 1991, p. 650). 
In addition to the discrepancy that exists between studies utilizing the same coding 
procedures for analysing TST responses, several researchers have chosen to adjust 
these procedures or to develop entirely new ones based on own research interests. 
For example, Watkins and colleagues (Watkins & Gerong, 1999; Watkins et al., 
1998, 2003; Watkins, Yau, Dahlin, & Wondimu, 1997) kept Trafimow et al.’s 
categorisation of TST responses into idiocentric and allocentric, but decided to 
further distinguish between small group and large group self-descriptions. Hence, 
according to this coding scheme, I am happy would be classified as idiocentric, I 
am a sociable person as allocentric, I am a husband as a small group description, 
and I am a student as a large group description (Watkins et al., 1997). Similarly, 
Cousins’ (1989) categorisation was later expanded to include 10 (Kanagawa et al., 
2001), 16 (Somech, 2000), 33 (Rhee et al., 1995), or even 40 (Eaton & Louw, 
2000) subcategories in total. Alternatively, Adams, Van de Vijver, and De Bruin 
(2012) developed their own coding procedure through an iterative approach to TST 
data collected in South Africa. All in all, the heterogeneous utilization of TST 
coding procedures in cross-cultural investigations makes the comparison of the 
investigations’ findings extremely difficult (Cross et al., 2011; Smith, 2011). 
Finally, the assumed lack of cultural bias in the TST’s response format has been 
questioned as well. First, it has been suggested that participants from collectivist 
cultures might have difficulties describing themselves without any contextual cues, 
as context sensitivity is an inherent characteristic of interdependent self (Smith, 
2011). In this regard, Cousins (1989) demonstrated that American and Japanese 
participants respond differently to TST in its standard version as compared to its 
contextualized version, in which the participants are asked to describe themselves 
in particular contexts (at home, at school, and with close friends). Second, Triandis 
(1989) argued that individuals from collectivist countries tend to maintain fewer but 
more self-defining group memberships than participants from individualist 
countries. Following this argument, some authors (Cross et al., 2011; Dabul et al., 
1995; Trafimow & Finlay, 2001) criticized TST for solely assessing the amount but 
not the importance of elicited self-descriptions. All in all, it appears that the field of 
cross-cultural psychology could benefit from alternative measures of self, such as 
the aforementioned autobiographical memories.  
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2.4.3. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
It is possible to identify various kinds of characteristics of autobiographical 
memories that have been utilized to study self in previous research. First, specific 
functions of autobiographical memories have been identified to describe ways in 
which individuals use their memories in everyday life. These functions have been 
often self-reported via Likert-type rating scales, such as the Thinking About Life 
Experiences scale (TALE; Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011). In TALE, 
participants are asked to indicate how often they think back over or talk about their 
life with a particular function in mind (e.g. when I want to feel that I am the same 
person that I was before) instead of recalling specific autobiographical episodes. 
In contrast, several autobiographical memories were reported by participants in 
investigations that were to test the self-memory system model (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). For example, Rathbone and colleagues (Chessell, 
Rathbone, Souchay, Charlesworth, & Moulin, 2014; Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 
2008) asked participants to write down statements that they felt defined their 
identity8, and then to recall autobiographical memories associated with these 
statements. Afterwards, participants noted their age at which the events described in 
the memories occurred, as well as their age at which the provided statements 
became a defining part of their identity. Analyses revealed a coincidence between 
the respective age estimations, that is, memories recalled to a particular identity 
statement clustered around the time when this statement became self-defining for 
the participant. According to the authors, this coincidence exemplified how 
autobiographical memories ground self and how self in turn organizes 
autobiographical experience (Rathbone et al., 2008). In line with this interpretation, 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories has been widely studied in 
cognitive psychology, most notably in the form of the so-called lifespan retrieval 
curve (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). The lifespan retrieval curve is thought to reflect 
different periods of self-development across lifespan (Conway, 2005; Rathbone et 
al., 2008), consisting of periods of childhood amnesia, reminiscence bump, and 
recency. These periods describe how individual’s autobiographical memories 
typically emerge only at around the age of five, how their amount significantly 
increases between the age of ten and 30, and how it finally peaks in the most recent 
years of individual’s life, respectively. 
Instead of solely focusing on memories’ temporal distribution, personality 
psychologists have paid attention to the content of autobiographical memories, that 
is, what the reported memories were actually about. For instance, Woike and 
                                                            
8 This procedure was in one of the investigations described as “a variant of the TST” 
(Rathbone et al., 2008, p. 1405); later on, it was referred to as the IAM Task (Chessell et al., 
2014).  
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colleagues (Woike, Gershkovich, Piorkowski, & Polo, 1999; Woike & Polo, 2001) 
differentiated between memories with agentic (e.g. accomplishment) or communal 
(e.g. social acceptance) themes, finding that participants with strong achievement 
motivation tended to recall the former, while participants with strong communal 
motivation tended to recall the latter. In a similar vein, McAdams et al. (McAdams, 
Hoffman, Mansfield, & Day, 1996) scored oral and written autobiographical 
memories for four agentic and four communal themes. Participants’ scores on these 
themes were shown to correlate with corresponding measures of participants’ 
motivation and personal strivings, suggesting a thematic coherence between 
personality motives and autobiographical memories’ content. 
Cross-cultural research has also appropriated the temporal distribution and 
particular content characteristics of autobiographical memories as measures of self. 
With regards to the former, most cross-cultural investigations have focused on the 
phenomenon of childhood amnesia, comparing the average age at the earliest 
childhood memory across culturally divergent populations (de la Mata, Santamaría, 
Hansen, Ruiz, & Ruiz, 2011; de la Mata, Santamaría, Hansen, & Ruiz, 2014; 
Fitzgerald, 2010; MacDonald, Uesiliana, & Hayne, 2000; Wang, 2001; but see also 
Wang, 2006b); while reminiscence bump has been investigated much less (e.g. 
Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 2005). When it comes to the latter, various 
coding techniques have been developed for analysing autobiographical memories’ 
content. For instance, similar to the technique employed by the aforementioned 
personality psychologists, memories have been assigned to one of several thematic 
categories, such as achievement and social content (Ivcevic et al., 2008); personal 
experiences, social events, and historical events (de la Mata et al., 2011; Ho, Chen, 
& Hoffman, 2012; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008; Wang & Conway, 2004); 
individual, family, neighbourhood, and school context (de la Mata et al., 2014; 
Wang, 2001), or sociocultural events (Fitzgerald, 2010). An example of a non-
thematic categorization is the differentiation between specific and general 
memories, that is, between memories of one-time as compared to recurrent events 
(Bender & Chasiotis, 2010; de la Mata et al., 2011, 2014; Ho et al., 2012; Ho, 
Chen, Hoffman, Guan, & Iversen, 2013; Wang & Conway, 2004; Wang, 2001, 
2004, 2006b). 
In addition to simply assigning memories to particular thematic or non-thematic 
categories, a more in-depth content analysis of autobiographical memories has been 
conducted in several cross-cultural investigations. This analysis entailed counting 
various kinds of references within the reported memories, such as references to the 
individual himself or herself, references to other people, to social interactions, 
emotional states, or autonomy. The total amount of such references was then 
represented in variables like number of other people, other-self ratio, interaction 
scenarios, emotionality, or autonomous orientation (e.g. Wang & Conway, 2004). 
Finally, autobiographical memories’ form has been of interest to some researchers 
as well, most notably the memory volume, operationalized as the number of words 
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included in a memory. Memory volume has been utilized both as a variable in its 
own right as well as a control variable for memory content analyses (de la Mata et 
al., 2014; Demuth, Chaudhary, & Keller, 2011; Fitzgerald, 2010; Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2008; Wang & Conway, 2004; Wang, 2001, 2004). 
What all these accessibility, content, and form characteristics of autobiographical 
memories have been proposed to reflect is the memories’ predominant focus on self 
versus other people. This focus has often been explained in terms of Markus and 
Kitayama’s (1991) independent and interdependent self. Namely, an individual 
reporting early, specific, highly emotional memories of personal experiences with a 
lot of references to oneself and one’s autonomy would be assumed to have an 
independent rather than interdependent self, and vice versa. Yet, only a few studies 
have in fact tested this assumption, and that by relating a more traditional measure 
of self, in this case TST, to autobiographical memories. Here, the difference 
between the amount of private and collective self-descriptions was found to 
correlate positively with memory specificity and other-self ratio (Wang, 2001) as 
well as with memory volume and autonomous orientation (Wang, 2004). 
To summarize, measuring self cross-culturally is a challenging task. Both close-
ended designs, that is, Likert-type rating scales, and open-ended designs, that is, 
TST, have been shown to have their weaknesses. While some authors (e.g. 
Bresnahan et al., 2005) have advocated for the use of TST, appreciating its high 
face validity, other authors have endorsed scales, simply because “the open-ended 
and qualitative nature of the TST precludes traditional psychometric assessment” 
(Grace & Cramer, 2003, p. 663). Moreover, the two types of measures appear to 
lack convergent validity, as documented in a number of investigations. For 
instance, Bresnahan and colleagues (Bresnahan et al., 2005) analysed TST self-
descriptions of Korean, Japanese, and American participants based on the tripartite 
model of independent, collective, and relational self. Across all three samples, the 
authors found no correlations between the amount of independent self-descriptions 
and the independent score on SCS and neither between the amount of collective 
self-descriptions and the interdependent score on SCS. A significant, but small 
positive correlation was detected between the amount of relational self-descriptions 
and the overall score on the Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal scale (RISC; 
Cross et al., 2000). Similarly, Emiko Kashima and Elizabeth Hardie (2000) found 
no correlations between the relational, individual, and collective TST scores and the 
corresponding subscales’ scores of their newly developed scale (Relational, 
Individual, and Collective self-aspects scale; RIC). Finally, Grace and Cramer 
(2003) applied Watkins et al.’s (1998) coding categories to their TST data. Apart 
from a positive correlation between the interdependent score on SCS and the 
amount of allocentric responses, no other indicator of convergence between the two 
measures of self was found. In light of these results, some authors speculated that 
the Likert-type rating scales and TST tap different constructs. Kim and Raja (2003) 
specifically hypothesized that “the different instruments are designed to measure 
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different aspects of self-representations” (p. 283); namely, that TST tapped a 
dynamic aspect of self, while SCS (and possibly other scales as well) tapped a 
stable aspect of self. Hence, the convergent validity of TST and rating scales 
appears to be even weaker than the convergent validity of TST and 
autobiographical memories. This is despite the fact that the association between 
particular types of TST self-descriptions on the one hand and corresponding 
characteristics of autobiographical memories on the other has so far been 
demonstrated in only two studies. 
All in all, cross-cultural psychology has by now established, both theoretically and 
empirically, that different cultural groups construct their selves in distinct ways, not 
only in accordance with the Western notion of independence. Most notably, the 
Eastern (i.e. East-Asian) notion of interdependence was introduced as an alternative 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). However, even the popular model of independent and 
interdependent self was eventually challenged by contradictory and inconsistent 
findings, both from the standard North American and East Asian university student 
samples, as well as new populations. As a result, several refinements of the model 
were put forward, such as the distinction between collective and relational self 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996) and the model of autonomous-related self (Kagitcibasi, 
2005). At the same time, the utility of traditional measures of self became 
questioned and new instruments were developed, mainly in the form of close-
ended, Likert-type rating scales (e.g. Cross et al., 2000; Kagitcibasi, 2007; E. 
Kashima & Hardie, 2000). Autobiographical memories as alternative, open-ended 
measures of self were proposed too, and that based on a conceptualization of self as 
inherently autobiographical (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002). In summary, the 
theoretical as well as methodological tools for studying self cross-culturally have 
become increasingly nuanced in order to encompass the diversity of ways in which 
self is conceived of across a wide range of cultural groups. Yet, this did not 
necessarily imply an enhanced focus on cultures that were supposedly extremely 
different from one another. Quite to the contrary, the more recent trend has been to 
go beyond the traditional, large-scale, West-East comparisons, and to instead 
investigate self in novel contexts and on a smaller scale (see, for example, 
Santamaría et al., 2010). For instance, some researchers have chosen to examine 
self in exclusively European populations (Ciochină & Faria, 2009; Pouliasi & 
Verkuyten, 2012). 
2.5. THE CURRENT STUDY: SELF IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
Even though majority of cross-cultural investigations featuring European 
populations have looked at societal-level values, they provide valuable insights for 
the study of self in a European context. For example, in a recent multilevel analysis 
of the 2004 European Social Survey data from 195 European regions, van Herk and 
Poortinga (2011) showed that one of the most prominent antecedents of value 
differences across these regions is the regions’ Communist history (or lack thereof). 
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A similar result emerged when Inglehart and Baker (2000) analysed longitudinal 
data from the World Value Survey collected in 65 societies between the years 1981 
and 1998. Here, post-Communist countries were found to aggregate in a separate 
cultural zone, suggesting that the former Communist regime had left an imprint on 
these countries’ value systems. The prominent value researcher Shalom H. 
Schwartz (Bardi & Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) also suspected and 
demonstrated that values endorsed in post-communist Europe differed from those 
promoted in other cultural areas, and that at both societal and individual level of 
analysis. Hence, there is good reason to suspect that the experience with 
Communist regime could be an equally important factor when investigating self in 
European populations. 
For understandable reasons, cross-cultural studies featuring samples from post-
Communist Europe have often focused on values, attitudes, and behaviours of 
political relevance. For instance, Plichtová and colleagues (Moodie, Marková, & 
Plichtová, 1995; Plichtová & Erös, 1998) investigated social representations9 of 
democracy in three generations in Slovakia, as compared to Scotland, as well as 
Slovaks’ and Hungarians’ opinions about political changes in their respective 
countries. Macek and colleagues (Macek et al., 1998; Macek, Bejcek, & 
Vaníčková, 2007) similarly examined perceptions of political changes after the fall 
of Communism, this time in Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian adolescents. 
Klicperová, Feierabend, and Hofstetter (1997) went as far as proposing that in the 
aftermath of having lived under the Communist regime, individuals living in post-
Communist countries have developed a distinct pattern of attitudes and behaviours 
called the post-Communist syndrome. According to Klicperová, Feierabend, and 
Hofstetter, the post-Communist syndrome would manifest itself in learned 
helplessness, immorality, and abuse of civic virtues. Other authors talked about 
fatalism (Goodwin, Nizharadze, Lan Anh Nguyen, Kosa, & Emelyanova, 2001), 
helplessness (Gavreliuc, 2012), or “an acceptance of conformity and a rejection of 
self-direction goals” (Bardi & Schwartz, 1996, p. 542). Lack of trust towards local 
communities, public institutions, or society at large was also proposed as 
characteristic of individuals living in post-Communist countries (Fülöp, 2005; 
Macek et al., 2003), corroborating the claim that “anything that undermines the 
normative order [such as] rapid social change . . . is likely to produce an increase in 
distrust and untrustworthy behaviour” (Delhey & Newton, 2005, p. 312). 
                                                            
9 Social representations are ”systems of values, ideas, and practices that are on the one hand 
the outcome of social construction by a group of people, and on the other hand the processes 
through which people make sense of the material and social world. In this sense, they 
represent an intermediate level between the individual and the culture” (Berry et al., 2011, p. 
91). 
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In contrast, an exceptionally high generalized trust has been observed in 
Scandinavian countries. In one study (Delhey & Newton, 2005), more than half of 
the queried Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish participants stated that according to 
them, most people could be trusted. Such high levels of trust have been linked to 
various economic and political variables, such as wealth or good government, but 
also to cultural values. For instance, individualism was reported to correlate 
positively with the level of generalized trust (Allik & Realo, 2004) as well as the 
radius of trust, that is, “the width of the circle of people among whom a certain trust 
level exists” (van Hoorn, 2014, p. 270). While Scandinavian countries are known to 
be quite individualist (Hofstede, 2001), Gullestad (1991) argued that Scandinavia in 
general, and Norway in particular, had its own, Scandinavian version of egalitarian 
individualism. Here, while equality was highly valued, it was not understood in 
terms of equal opportunity, but rather in terms of sameness, that is, the absence of 
differences, hierarchical relations, and injustice. This understanding of equality in 
Norway, and also Denmark, has been sometimes in the literature illustrated by the 
so-called Jante law (Nelson & Shavitt, 2002; Thomsen, Sidanius, & Fiske, 2007). 
In short, Jante law is an unwritten social modesty code, which prescribes one not to 
think to be better than others. Some empirical evidence for strong egalitarian values 
and social modesty can indeed be seen in two investigations conducted in Denmark 
(Nelson & Shavitt, 2002; Thomsen et al., 2007). In the first investigation, with the 
use of both qualitative and quantitative methods, Danes were shown to be more 
egalitarian in their cultural orientation than Americans and to value social justice 
and equality more than Americans. In the second investigation, Danes self-
enhanced significantly less than Americans, and that despite the fact that they were 
found to be more independent on both TST and SCS. 
Taken together, a mixture of societal- and individual-level cross-cultural studies of 
various psychological phenomena indicates that post-Communist Europe and 
Scandinavia are distinct cultural areas. However, when it comes to cross-cultural 
research on self, previous work in these areas has been scarce (Gavreliuc, 2012; 
Santamaría et al., 2010; Thomsen et al., 2007), whereas direct comparison between 
them is non-existent. Hence, in line with the recent trend in cross-cultural 
psychology, the current study sets out to investigate self in novel samples of 
individuals from post-Communist Europe and Scandinavia. For this purpose, it 
intends to utilize theoretical refinements of the model of independent and 
interdependent self, namely the distinction between relational and collective self, 
the model of autonomous-related self, and the notion of autobiographical self. In 
accordance with these two objectives, the study aims to adopt and possibly 
further develop relevant measures of self, specifically TST and autobiographical 
memories. The next chapter provides a methodological overview of the current 
thesis. More concretely, the chapter begins by refining the current study’s 
theoretical framework, followed by the presentation of the study’s design, 
participants and procedure as well as materials and analyses. Finally, ethical issues 
relevant to the current study are discussed.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The first step in answering the current study’s research question is graphically 
represented in Figure 8 below. Namely, by combining Figure 5 and Figure 7 
presented earlier, Figure 8 integrates theoretical frameworks behind the most 
prominent conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology. The purpose of 
the integrated framework is to show self as a part of a complex process of culture’s 
influence on individual. First, this process includes socioecological factors, 
emphasized in the field of socioecological psychology (Oishi & Graham, 2010) as 
well as in the work of Patricia Greenfield (Greenfield et al., 2003; Greenfield, 2000, 
2009, 2013) and Cigdem Kagitcibasi (2005, 2007, 2013). Second, the process 
comprises culture, which is in the current thesis understood as a psychological 
construct shared by a group of individuals, such as nations (Minkov & Hofstede, 
2012, 2014). Third, family is recognized as an important context for culture’s 
influence on individual (Kagitcibasi, 2007). In this respect, some cross-cultural 
developmental literature has focused on parental ethnotheories, goals and practices 
(Kärtner et al., 2007; Seidl-de-Moura et al., 2013), while other work in this area has 
been concerned with family reminiscing practices (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Nelson 
& Fivush, 2004). The close interrelationship between autobiographical memories 
and self is incorporated in the framework (Wang, 2001, 2004). Finally, embedded 
within a particular socioecological, cultural, and family environment, self is seen as 
having important consequences for psychological processes (Cross et al., 2000; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Schematic representation of the thesis’ refined theoretical framework. 
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While the integrated framework in Figure 8 provides an overview of a complex 
relation between culture and self, it is beyond the scope of the current study to 
investigate it in its entirety. The actual scope of the current study is explicated in the 
next section. 
3.1. DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
To begin with, socioecological factors are incorporated in the design of the current 
study in a twofold manner. First, encompassing regions of post-Communist Europe 
and Scandinavia, the study acknowledges the difference between the regions’ 
political recent past and present and examines a possible significance of this 
difference when comparing self in populations living in these regions. In order to 
capture the effect of sociopolitical change on various psychological characteristics, 
previous research in post-Communist countries has sampled participants from 
different age groups, that is, participants with varying degrees of Communist 
experience (Gavreliuc, 2012; Goodwin et al., 2001; Marková et al., 1998; Moodie, 
Marková, Farr, & Plichtová, 1997; Plichtová & Erös, 1998; Varnum, 2008). 
Similarly, the sample of the current study includes participants of different 
generations, while employing a cross-sectional cohort design. Second, Greenfield 
(2013) pointed out that members of different socioeconomic strata within a country 
might endorse different cultural values, thereby emphasizing the role of 
sociodemographics, such as education and urbanization, in value formation. 
Moreover, recent work has shown that people with different levels of formal 
education maintain different types of self and report autobiographical memories of 
different qualities (de la Mata et al., 2011; de la Mata & Santamaría, 2010; Dost-
Gözkan & Küntay, 2014; Kingo, Berntsen, & Krøjgaard, 2013; Santamaría et al., 
2012). Hence, there is reason to believe that participants’ sociodemographic 
characteristics need to be considered in investigations of self as well. Therefore, the 
current study pays attention to individual-level sociodemographics, such as formal 
education and place of residence, in addition to societal-level socioecological 
factors, like political systems.  
On the whole, the current study is conducted at the individual level of analysis, as it 
investigates an intrinsically individual-level phenomenon, that is, self, in a small 
number of cultural samples. Previous investigations of a similar kind (e.g. Kolstad 
& Horpestad, 2009) have used societal-level characteristics of these cultures, like 
their degree of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 2001), to infer 
prevalence of particular types of self therein. For example, if a culture had 
previously been characterized as individualist, participants sampled from this 
culture were hypothesized to maintain an independent self. However, such 
hypothesis would be warranted only if the within-culture variation in self was very 
limited, or if the study’s samples were representative (Berry et al., 2011; van de 
Vijver et al., 2008). These requirements are due to individualism-collectivism being 
a nonisomorphic construct, i.e. having a distinct structure at each level of analysis 
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(Oyserman & Uskul, 2008; van de Vijver et al., 2008). More concretely, when 
analysed at the societal level, individualism and collectivism form opposite poles of 
a single continuum, while at the individual level of analysis, the two are usually 
reflected in several orthogonal factors (H. Triandis, 2001). Therefore, Hofstede’s 
individualism-collectivism scores for cultures featured in the current study cannot 
be used to predict prevalence of particular types of self in these cultures and vice 
versa; the study’s data on self cannot serve as an indication of the cultures’ score on 
the individualism-collectivism dimension10. 
Next, Chapter 2 briefly touched upon the importance of parental values and beliefs 
regarding childcare (see section 2.3.2.) and of family reminiscing (see section 
2.3.3.) for the development of self. Instead of documenting these family 
socialization practices in everyday life, some authors have argued that family’s 
importance for self-development can be studied indirectly, through individual’s 
autobiographical memories (McLean & Thorne, 2003; Peterson, Bonechi, Smorti, 
& Tani, 2010; Peterson, Smorti, & Tani, 2008; Tani, Bonechi, Peterson, & Smorti, 
2010; Wang, 2006b). In line with this argumentation, memories of family as well as 
of other interpersonal settings have been used as a “reflective mirror” (Peterson et 
al., 2010) for changes in self and in self’s relation to these settings across time. A 
similar technique is thus adopted in the current study’s design.  
The main focus of the current study is self, more specifically, its conceptualization 
and operationalization in a novel, European context. With respect to the latter, two 
measures of self are utilized in the study’s design; namely, the Twenty Statements 
Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and autobiographical memories. TST is chosen 
due to its open-ended and straightforward format, which makes it well suited for 
cross-cultural research in general and for cross-cultural research in novel contexts 
in particular (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Carpenter & Meade-Pruitt, 2008; del Prado et 
al., 2007). Autobiographical memories are chosen due to their strong theoretical 
(see section 2.3.3.) as well as empirical (see section 2.4.3.) association with self. 
Moreover, the two measures are selected because of their somewhat established 
convergent validity (Wang, 2001, 2004). 
Finally, numerous cross-cultural investigations have documented hypothesized 
consequences of particular types of self for psychological processes, namely 
cognition, emotion, and motivation (for a review, see Cross et al., 2011). Even 
though the current study investigates autobiographical memories, that is, a cognitive 
phenomenon, Figure 8 shows them separated from other aspects of psychological 
processes. This is due to the especially close interrelationship between self and 
                                                            
10 While the former assumption would be a case of the ecological fallacy, the latter would be 
an example of the reverse ecological fallacy (see section 2.3.; also Bond, 2002; Hofstede, 
1980, 2001). 
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autobiographical memories and the thesis’ focus on how the two “make each other 
up”. 
Taken together, the above explication points to several variables relevant to the 
current study, whether in terms of the study’s participants, such as their age, or with 
respect to the study’s materials, such as the type of autobiographical memories 
solicited from these participants. The next two sections describe these two groups 
of variables in more detail. 
3.2. PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
On the whole, the sample of the current study consists of several subsamples (see 
Table 2 and Table 3). First, the sample includes participants from post-Communist 
Europe and Scandinavia, specifically from Slovakia, Norway, and Denmark. Next, 
the sample comprises participants from different age groups, which in the case of 
Slovakia equals to participants with different degrees of Communist experience. In 
the current study, this experience is either absolutely none (adolescents born after 
1989) or extensive, spanning several decades (older adults). While the Danish 
subsample features participants from both age groups, the Norwegian subsample 
consists of adolescents only. The respective cultural and age groups are further 
described in terms of gender distribution (Table 2) and distribution of the 
participants’ current place of residence (Table 3). Moreover, Table 4 provides 
additional information about the older adults from each culture, and that with 
regards to their highest attained level of formal education. As all adolescents 
featured in the current study were in their final year of secondary grammar school, 
their educational levels are comparable across cultures and hence require no further 
consideration. 
In total, 499 participants were queried in the current study. Some of these 
participants did not fit in the relevant subsamples, because they were, for instance, 
born in another culture or were too young or too old. Therefore, they were excluded 
from the subsequent analyses, as were participants that did not follow the given 
instructions; that is, left big parts of the response sheets blank, disclosed no 
demographic information, or did not take the task at hand seriously. Finally, some 
participants were chosen over others in order to keep particular subsamples as 
comparable to each other as possible, for example, balanced for gender or current 
place of residence.   
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Age group Gender Culture 
Slovakia Norway Denmark 
Adolescents Female 93 20 56 
Male 75 14 51 
Total 168 34 108* 
Older adults Female 60 - 49 
Male 34 - 46 
Total 94 - 95 
Total   262 34 203 
Table 2. Distribution of the study’s participants based on their cultural background, age, and 
gender.  
* Note: These rows do not add up to totals because of missing demographic data.  
Several recruitment methods were used in the current study. First, the adolescent 
subsamples were recruited through their secondary grammar schools. Here, 
headmasters of the respective schools in Slovakia, Norway, and Denmark were 
contacted first. Then, individual agreements were made with some of the schools’ 
teachers with regards to the most appropriate time and place for data collection. In 
all instances, data collection took place in classrooms during regular teaching hours. 
No compensation was given for participation in the study. 
Second, potential participants for the older adult subsamples were approached in 
different locations, including university and municipality offices, shops, libraries, 
and others. Moreover, by the means of snowball sampling, the researcher’s social 
networks provided access to additional individual participants, such as friends of 
relatives or neighbours, as well as participant groups, like employees of a particular 
company. Here, the procedure of data collection varied according to the specific 
location, but on most occasions, the study’s materials were first handed out and 
then, depending on the agreement with the participant, collected shortly thereafter. 
Again, no compensation was given for participation in the study.   
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Age group Size of 
place of 
residence 
Culture 
Slovakia Norway Denmark 
Adolescents > 50,000 0 0 9 
> 20,000 97 0 38 
>10,000 0 0 1 
> 5,000 11 0 12 
< 5,000 60 34 47 
Total 168 34 108* 
Older adults > 50,000 0 - 44 
> 20,000 79 - 5 
>10,000 1 - 8 
> 5,000 1 - 17 
< 5,000 10 - 28 
Total 94 - 95 
Total   262 34 203 
Table 3. Distribution of the study’s participants based on their cultural background, age, and 
place of residence.  
* Note: These rows do not add up to totals because of missing demographic data.  
Data collection in Norway was carried out with the assistance of a Norwegian 
Master student in psychology, and data collection in Denmark was carried out with 
the assistance of a group of Bachelor students in psychology, under the supervision 
of the thesis’ author. All data was collected in years 2010-2012.   
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Educational level Culture 
Slovakia Denmark 
Elementary 0 13 
Secondary  42 28 
University  36 51 
Total  94* 95* 
Table 4. Distribution of the older adult subsamples based on their cultural background and 
educational level.  
* Note: These rows do not add up to totals because of missing demographic data.  
3.3. MATERIALS AND ANALYSES  
As mentioned above, the current study utilizes two measures of self, namely TST 
and autobiographical memories, and combines them in a written questionnaire 
format (similarly to de la Mata et al., 2014; Santamaría et al., 2010; Wang, 
Leichtman, & White, 1998; Wang, 2001, 2004). In short, the questionnaire (see 
Appendix A for more details) consists of a title page with a brief introduction and 
instruction, followed by a page for report of participant’s earliest childhood 
memory. The third page features five questions about the just recalled memory; 
specifically, the questions inquire about participant’s age at the time of the reported 
event, his or her feelings during the event, frequency of prior recollection of the 
earliest childhood memory in particular and of early childhood memories in 
general. A shortened version of TST is presented on the next page, while the 
demographic sheet comes last. For a small subset of participants, the questionnaire 
was slightly modified from its original version as seen in Appendix A. Specifically, 
in addition to the earliest childhood memory, participants were requested to recall 
and report especially meaningful memories about their family, school, and friends, 
and that right after the questions about the earliest childhood memory and just 
before the completion of the shortened TST. Description of each of the three 
additional memories was furthermore succeeded by five questions, similar to the 
ones concerning the earliest childhood memory. The questionnaire was originally 
constructed in English and then back-translated (Brislin, 1980) to Slovak, Danish, 
and Norwegian. 
Even though the order of the tasks’ presentation within the questionnaire was 
adapted from previous research, an exploratory pilot study was conducted to check 
for possible priming effects (Jensen, Kristensen, & Steinmeier, 2012). In the study, 
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one group of secondary high school students was asked to fill out the questionnaire 
as it is used in the current study, while another group was given a questionnaire in 
which the shortened TST was presented before the recall of the earliest childhood 
memory. The two participant groups were then compared on the distribution of 
private, public, and collective self-descriptions, as well as positive, negative, and 
neutral self-descriptions. Since none of the comparisons yielded significant results, 
the study concluded that the order in which the tasks are presented within the 
questionnaire should not influence the content of participants’ responses. 
Due to its generally open-ended format, the questionnaire employed in the current 
study generates predominantly qualitative text data. The data is subsequently 
subjected to content analysis, that is, quantified with the use of specific coding 
categories (Coolican, 2009). A considerable part of the study’s results in Chapter 4 
is dedicated to describing both previously used as well as newly developed 
approaches to this type of analysis, since one of the aims of the current thesis is to 
refine methodological tools for investigating self. A few general issues concerning 
the utilization of TST and autobiographical memories in the current study are 
however outlined in the next two sections. 
3.3.1. SHORTENED TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST 
The shortened version of TST (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) was originally 
introduced by Bochner (1994). Bochner argued that after about 10 lines, 
participants responding to TST tend to give up or begin to repeat themselves, and 
therefore, solicitation of 20 self-descriptions is unnecessary. This argument was 
supported by Watkins and colleagues (Watkins et al., 1997), who tested whether 
proportions of TST statements across coding categories differed depending on if 
only the first seven, only the first 10, or all 20 statements, would be analysed. In a 
sample of 165 Hong Kong, 100 Swedish, and 100 Ethiopian students, such 
difference was observed only in the Hong-Kong data; namely, the more TST 
statements per participant were analysed, the more idiographic and the less large-
group statements were found. Still, as the overall pattern of culture and gender 
differences remained the same across the three codings, Watkins et al. (1997; but 
see Schwirian, 1964) concluded that the amount of TST statements analysed per 
participant in a study should not have an effect on the study’s results. Therefore, in 
line with some of previous research (e.g. E. Kashima & Hardie, 2000; Parkes et al., 
1999; Santamaría et al., 2010; Wang, Leichtman, & White, 1998; Wang, 2001), the 
current study employs a shortened version of TST, which consists of 10 instead of 
20 lines. 
Another proposal that was made by Bochner (1994) was to weigh participant’s self-
descriptions according to the order in which the participant reports them, since “the 
order in which a participant completes the ‘I am’ sentences reflects the state or trait 
salience of those self-references” (p. 276). However, as this proposal was not 
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supported in other investigations (Wang et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 1997), the 
current study analyses unweighted responses, similarly to the majority of previous 
research.  
An important task in any type of content analysis lies in identifying coding units 
(Coolican, 2009). In the case of TST, this task becomes relevant when participants 
describe themselves in multiple ways within a single line. In this respect, Bond and 
Cheung (1983; see also Rhee et al., 1995) distinguished between meaning units and 
statement units, where one statement unit (e.g. I am a competent student) could 
include multiple meaning units (e.g. I am a student, I am competent). Alternatively, 
Cousins (1989) defined a unit of analysis as “the independent clause consisting of 
no more than one verb-object, verb-predicate nominative, or verb-predicate 
adjective sequence, for example, ‘I am usually friendly and affectionate, but can be 
mean to certain people’ (three units) or ‘I like playing cards with my friend, 
because I always win’ (two units)” (p. 127). According to this definition, the 
aforementioned example, I am a competent student, would include just one coding 
unit and not two, as suggested by Bond and Cheung. This example then illustrates 
how different approaches to identifying coding units can lead to different findings; 
therefore, this particular matter has been carefully considered in the current study as 
well (see Chapter 4). 
While some participants provide rich and diverse self-descriptions, others do not fill 
out all lines of TST, and that even when they are presented with the shortened 
version of the test. In order to control for this interindividual variation, previous 
research has utilized proportion scores for analysis (Bond & Cheung, 1983; 
Cousins, 1989; Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, Thapa, & Rettek, 1995; Gabriel & 
Gardner, 1999; Grace & Cramer, 2003; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Parkes et al., 1999; 
Somech, 2000). Proportion scores are obtained by simply dividing the amount of 
participant’s self-descriptions in each coding category by their total amount. 
Proportion scores are also used in the current study.  
Finally, as noted in section 2.4.2., a great number of coding schemes for 
categorizing TST self-descriptions is available in the literature. Moreover, some of 
these coding schemes propose contradictory categorization criteria. For instance, 
references to family roles (e.g. I am a son, I am a mother) are sometimes considered 
collective (Wang, 2001), other times relational (Cross et al., 2011) descriptions. 
Similarly, self-descriptions like I am friendly are by some authors thought to 
implicitly express a relational orientation of the participant (Adams et al., 2012), 
while most authors code these statements as simply personal or independent (Rhee 
et al., 1995). Likewise, E. Kashima and Hardie (2000) list I am a cricket fan as an 
example of collective self-descriptions, whereas I like hockey is by Wang (2004) 
categorized as a private self-description. Hence, in the current study, a great amount 
of effort and time was dedicated to developing a systematic and transparent coding 
scheme for analysing TST data. Specifically, the scheme’s development proceeded 
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through a number of stages. The first stages were marked by a rather exploratory 
and detailed approach (see Appendix B), which helped to identify self-descriptions 
with a possibly ambiguous meaning, as illustrated above. Afterwards, by means of 
continuous coding and re-coding, majority of the initial subcategories were found to 
be superfluous or vague and were thus gradually abandoned. Once the final version 
of the coding scheme was established and all data was coded by the thesis’ author, 
two independent raters from a Danish and Slovak cultural background were 
involved in order to establish interrater reliability. Staying blind to the hypotheses 
of the study, the raters coded 20% of the total responses in the respective languages, 
which is the amount commonly reported in similar research (e.g. Alea, Bluck, & 
Semegon, 2004; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008; Rhee et al., 1995). Inspection of 
discrepancies between the raters showed that majority of these regarded 
identification of coding units rather than the actual categorization of responses. All 
discrepancies were resolved through discussion.  
According to Brislin (1980), all types of content analysis should fulfil two criteria, 
namely replicability and generality. While the former refers to employment of 
explicit rules necessary for analysis’ replication, the latter concerns theoretical 
relevance of analysis’ findings. These two criteria were also considered when 
developing the current coding scheme; namely, that the scheme was both 
theoretically anchored and clearly documented. Moreover, the scheme’s 
development was guided by one additional requirement, which was the scheme’s 
possible application across several languages. 
3.3.2. RECALL OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
In the current study, participants’ autobiographical memory recall was promted 
either with the use of a temporal marker, by asking for their earliest childhood 
memory, or with the use of cue words, such as family, school and friends. In the 
latter case, participants were moreover asked to recall particularly meaningful 
memories. Furthermore, two types of memories’ analysis were employed in the 
current study; the first type was strongly inspired by previous research, most 
notably by the work of Qi Wang (Wang, 2001, 2004, 2006b). Even though Wang 
provides quite specific coding instructions in her publications, these instructions 
needed to be further developed in order to be applied consistently across the data set 
in the current study. Appendix C illustrates this development with respect to one 
particular memory content variable, namely the other-self ratio. Other-self ratio 
expresses the number of times participants refer to other people, as compared to the 
number of times they refer to themselves, in their memories’ descriptions. During 
the coding process, some of these references were found ambiguous and thus 
needed to be evaluated in a more systematic manner. Appendix C presents an 
overview of such references together with some examples, which were taken from 
both Danish and Slovak data. The second type of memory analysis employed in the 
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current study was specifically developed for the study’s purposes and is thus 
described in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.4. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
At the time of data collection, only biomedical research projects were eligible for 
ethical review by the Regional Ethical Committee of North Jutland. Therefore, the 
current study was evaluated internally and granted approval by the Human 
Research Ethics Board of the Faculty of Humanities, Aalborg University (see 
Appendix D). The study was evaluated as being of a low risk, as it neither involves 
biomedical intervention, relies on deception of participants, nor it is conducted with 
vulnerable participant groups or in unsafe geographical areas. Moreover, as the data 
collection did not involve processing of personally sensitive data, the Danish Data 
Protection Agency was not notified of the study. Nevertheless, potentially relevant 
ethical issues were carefully considered in designing the study. An informed 
consent form (see Appendix E) was prepared and attached on top of every 
questionnaire disseminated during the data collection. The consent form informed 
the participants of the title of the study, simply phrased as Research on childhood 
memories and self-descriptions, and of the researchers involved in the study. The 
form then emphasized that the participation in the research was voluntary and 
anonymous. Moreover, briefing and debriefing procedures were employed in order 
to further ensure the study’s transparency to the participants, as well as the 
participants’ psychological comfort.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the current study in the form of four independent 
manuscripts; namely, one book chapter in print, one published and one accepted 
peer-reviewed article as well as one peer-reviewed article currently under review. 
The respective manuscripts are briefly outlined below. 
4.1. MANUSCRIPT 1: CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The first manuscript is an invited book chapter featured in a Danish introductory 
book to psychology. The manuscript is therefore a theoretical contribution and is 
written in Danish (translation into English is provided).  
Aim and relevance: The purpose of the manuscript is to introduce some of the key 
notions and themes of cross-cultural psychology to a lay reader. While the 
manuscript does not directly answer the current thesis’ research question, it 
provides a broad overview of the field the current thesis adheres to and thereby 
situates the thesis within this field.  
Short summary: The manuscript begins by describing culture as a complex 
phenomenon, which is not only hard to define but also to notice in everyday life. 
Here, the term culture is characterized as both external and internal, that is, as 
consisting of both physical elements, such as architecture, as well as psychological 
elements, such as social norms. It is however pointed out that psychology has 
mostly been interested in the internal, psychological characteristics of culture; the 
definition of culture adopted in the current study reflects this (see Chapter 2). Next, 
the origins of study of culture within psychology are briefly outlined, and the term 
ethnocentrism is introduced. The differences between the fields of indigenous, 
cultural, and cross-cultural psychology are pointed out, with the use of some 
examples. The first section of the manuscript concludes with a more precise 
definition of culture as well as of cross-cultural psychology.  
Values as the most researched psychological elements of culture are discussed next. 
Prominent value researchers Geert Hofstede and Shalom H. Schwartz and their 
respective models of societal-level value dimensions are briefly described. The 
distinction between societal and individual level is shortly mentioned before the 
introduction of the individual-level concepts of independent and interdependent 
self. A few paragraphs are dedicated to exemplifying the hypothesized 
consequences of these two selves, with special focus on cross-cultural differences in 
cognitive styles and autobiographical memories. Afterwards, cross-cultural research 
on emotions is used to illustrate the main ambition of cross-cultural psychology, 
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namely to identify cultural universals and cultural specifics in psychological 
processes. 
The last section before the conclusion deals with developmental perspectives in 
cross-cultural psychology, shortly referring to parental ethnotheories and to 
research on family reminiscing practices. The manuscript concludes with a few 
examples of practical application of cross-cultural psychology as well as some 
questions for future development of the field.  
4.2. MANUSCRIPT 2: ADOLESCENTS’ MEANINGFUL 
MEMORIES REFLECT A TRAJECTORY OF SELF-
DEVELOPMENT FROM FAMILY OVER SCHOOL TO 
FRIENDS 
The second manuscript is an empirical article published in a peer-reviewed journal 
and is written in English. 
Aim and relevance: In the context of the current thesis, the manuscript represents 
the first attempt at utilizing autobiographical memories as measures of self. 
Specifically, the manuscript aims to document the importance of family, school, 
and friends for self-development by comparing temporal distribution, content and 
accessibility characteristics of autobiographical memories about these settings. 
Hence, the manuscript is particularly concerned with the role of important 
interpersonal settings in the development of self, and with the appropriation of a 
novel instrument for gauging self. In this respect, the manuscript draws upon 
Kagitcibasi’s conceptualization of autonomy and relatedness. 
Short summary: The manuscript first introduces the concepts of self and 
autobiographical memory and highlights the close relationship between the two. 
Next, empirical evidence for this relationship is exemplified by referring to 
previous investigations, which have documented cross-cultural differences in 
various characteristics of autobiographical memories. Two of these investigations 
are described in more detail, as they both employ a within-subject in addition to a 
between-subject design, namely, they show how specific qualities of 
autobiographical memories vary not only across distinct cultural groups, but also 
within the same individuals. The manuscript adopts a similar approach, but this 
time focusing on adolescence, and specifically the negotiation of autonomy and 
relatedness during adolescence. More concretely, two samples of adolescents are 
asked to recall especially meaningful memories about their family, school, and 
friends. The degree of autonomy and relatedness expressed in these memories, as 
well as the memories’ temporal distribution and their prior recollection, are 
hypothesized to indicate how the roles of these settings in adolescents’ lives have 
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changed across time. The manuscript consists of two studies, conducted with 
Slovak and Norwegian adolescents, respectively. 
Results and conclusion: Coding criteria for content analysing the collected 
autobiographical memories were adopted from previous research. Analysis showed 
that in both studies, family memories were the oldest, followed by school and friend 
memories. Family and friend memories of Slovak adolescents were also found to 
express more relatedness than their school memories. Moreover, Slovak adolescents 
reported that they had thought and talked about their friend memories most often. 
The manuscript concludes by summarizing the results of both studies in a model 
and by pointing to the utility of autobiographical memories as measures of self.  
4.3. MANUSCRIPT 3: COLLECTIVISM POST COMMUNISM? 
SELF-CONSTRUALS IN TWO GENERATIONS IN 
SLOVAKIA AS COMPARED TO DENMARK 
The third manuscript is an empirical article currently under review in a peer-
reviewed journal and is written in English.  
Aim and relevance: The manuscript aims to establish whether and which type of 
interdependence is associated with the Communist experience, and that by 
examining the prevalence of relational and collective interdependence in two 
Slovak generations (adolescents, older adults) as compared to two similar Danish 
generations. For this purpose, the manuscript utilizes a theoretically anchored 
content analysis of TST self-descriptions. Hence, in the context of the current 
thesis, the manuscript pays special attention to the role of socioecological factors, 
namely political systems, in self-construction, as well as to the appropriation of 
TST as a measure of self. Theoretically, the manuscript draws upon the distinction 
between relational and collective self. 
Short summary: The manuscript begins with a concise review of cross-cultural 
investigations of values and self in post-Communist Europe. The review shows that 
while some studies find evidence for collectivist values and interdependent self in 
this area, results of research on social representations point to the contrary. It is thus 
hypothesized that this inconsistence is partly caused by the vague definitions of 
collectivism and interdependence in the respective literature. Indeed, in some cases, 
the two terms refer to relationships with close others, while in other cases, they 
denote the importance of group memberships (see section 2.3.1.). Hence, in order to 
disentangle the possible meanings of the two terms, the manuscript introduces the 
societal-level distinction between relational and group collectivism as well as the 
individual-level distinction between relational and collective interdependence. 
However, as the manuscript is based on an individual-level investigation, only the 
distinction between relational and collective interdependence is further elaborated 
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and later used to guide the content analysis of the collected data. The first half of 
the elicited self-descriptions is obtained from two age groups of participants from 
Slovakia: one that was raised during Communism (older adults) and other that was 
born after its collapse (adolescents). The second half of self-descriptions is obtained 
from similar age groups from a country that has never been communist, namely 
Denmark. 
Results and conclusion: In accordance with the aforementioned theoretical 
distinction, the employed coding scheme consisted of three main categories that 
differentiate between private, relational, and group self-descriptions. In addition, 
the relational category included two subcategories, which distinguish specific from 
non-specific relational self-descriptions. Application of the coding scheme to the 
data showed that group self-descriptions were more frequent among the young 
Slovaks and not among their older counterparts who had actually experienced 
Communism. Furthermore, relational interdependence was higher among the older 
than among the young generations in both countries. The results thus provided no 
support for the assumption that Communist experience relates to higher 
interdependence. Moreover, the manuscript demonstrated the importance of 
disentangling the different meanings of common terms such as collectivism and 
interdependence, both theoretically and in measurement.  
4.4. MANUSCRIPT 4: LOCATING THE SELF IN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES: A NEW APPROACH TO 
ANALYSIS 
The fourth manuscript is a theoretical article accepted in a peer-reviewed e-book 
and is written in English.  
Aim and relevance: The manuscript can be seen as an extension of the Manuscript 
2, as it presents a new approach to the content analysis of autobiographical 
memories. The approach aims to locate the self in autobiographical memories in a 
more nuanced and systematic way, and thus to be applicable in research with 
culturally diverse populations. Hence, the manuscript focuses on further validation 
of autobiographical memories as measures of self. Similarly to Manuscript 2, the 
manuscript draws upon Kagitcibasi’s conceptualization of autonomy and 
relatedness. 
Short summary: The manuscript first sketches the area of cross-cultural research 
concerned with the relationship between self and autobiographical memory. Earliest 
childhood memories are pointed to as the most frequently utilized and the most 
suitable memories for purposes of this research. The manuscript then briefly 
reviews the various, previously used content characteristics of autobiographical 
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memories and notes that majority of them has been based on Markus and 
Kitayama’s notion of independence as opposed to interdependence.  
The new approach to the content analysis of autobiographical memories proposes to 
instead employ Kagitcibasi’s model of autonomy and relatedness. Moreover, the 
approach incorporates Bruner’s distinction between landscape of action and 
landscape of consciousness to examine the incidence of actions, mental states, and 
reflections within the analysed memories. The resulting coding procedure consists 
of four steps. The first step is the identification of coding units. The next three steps 
place these units into particular coding categories, and that with regards to who the 
units’ subjects are, what these subjects are doing or experiencing, and whether they 
are thereby showing any signs of agency and/or relatedness. Two concrete 
examples are utilized to illustrate the coding procedure in practice.  
The manuscript concludes by suggesting possible applications of the presented 
approach in future research.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The current thesis was built around the following research question:  
From the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, how can self be measured in a 
European context? More concretely, how can the predominant theories and 
methods of the field be applied to compare selves of individuals living in post-
Communist Europe and Scandinavia? 
Each of the manuscripts presented in Chapter 4 provided a partial answer to this 
question. In the following, these partial answers are first discussed individually and 
then brought together in the General discussion section below. 
5.1. DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL MANUSCRIPTS 
5.1.1. MANUSCRIPT 1 
Manuscript 1 presented a broad overview of the field of cross-cultural psychology 
and hence served as a starting point for answering the thesis’ research question. In 
this respect, the manuscript’s explication of several terms was particularly 
instrumental. First, since the thesis’ research question specifically referred to cross-
cultural psychology, the manuscript’s demarcation of cross-cultural psychology 
from cultural11 and indigenous psychology helped to clarify the thesis’ particular 
focus. Indeed, the three disciplines hold markedly different views on how the 
relationship between individual and culture should be studied (see the special issue 
of Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2000, 3, on this topic). These differences 
have been paralleled to the distinction between emic and etic, relativist and 
universalist, and idiographic and nomothetic approaches (Kagitcibasi, 2007; Keith, 
2011). In short, these distinctions reflect a historically recurring theme in the study 
of human behaviour across cultures, namely “the tension between diversity and the 
search for universals” (Jahoda & Krewer, 1997, p. 4), that is, between focus on 
what is unique and what is comparable. Here, while cultural and indigenous 
psychologies generally emphasize the former, cross-cultural psychology is more 
interested in the latter (see also Chapter 1). 
                                                            
11 It is worth noting that the terms cultural psychology and cross-cultural psychology are 
used inconsistently in the literature. For instance, some authors refer to cultural psychology 
when presenting classical cross-cultural research (Cross et al., 2011; del Prado et al., 2007; 
Kanagawa et al., 2001), while others use cross-cultural psychology as an umbrella term for 
both culture-comparative (in the current thesis cross-cultural) and cultural psychology (Berry 
et al., 2011). 
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Second, since the thesis’ research question specifically referred to self, the 
manuscript’s introduction of values and self as key terms in cross-cultural 
psychology pointed to the importance of differentiating between the two. More 
concretely, since values express what is good and desirable (Schwartz, 2006), 
research on values has a normative focus (Kagitcibasi, 2005, 2007). On the other 
hand, self is largely defined by relations to other people, and thus research on self 
has a relational focus (Kagitcibasi, 2005, 2007). Moreover, values have been 
studied both at the individual and societal level of analysis, while self has been 
considered as an exclusively individual-level phenomenon (see Owe, 2012, for an 
exception). All in all, even though the two terms are closely related (Brewer & 
Chen, 2007), they are represented by distinct lines of research. While the current 
thesis drew on both cross-cultural research on values and cross-cultural research on 
self, it still generated only one type of data, namely individual-level data with focus 
on relationality. Therefore, inferences about values, and especially societal-level 
values, based on this data should be exercised with caution (see also section 3.1.). 
5.1.2. MANUSCRIPT 2 
Manuscript 2 described two pilot studies that tested the utility of autobiographical 
memories as measures of self. Therefore, the manuscript offered a methodological 
answer to the current thesis’ research question, namely, that self of individuals 
living in post-Communist Europe and Scandinavia could be measured by means of 
these individuals’ autobiographical memories.  
Moreover, the two studies’ results showed that autobiographical memories cued by 
particular words could document self’s development across time. Specifically, the 
cue words referred to different interpersonal settings that had supposedly shifted in 
their importance during participants’ lives, namely family, school, and friends. By 
recalling memories of their family, school, and friends, and by dating these 
memories back in time, participants then indirectly indicated when these shifts in 
importance had in fact occurred for them. This way of capturing past changes in 
self was quite original (see also Experiment 2 in Conway & Holmes, 2004, and 
Wang, 2006b), since similar investigations have mostly employed temporal markers 
instead of cue words when prompting autobiographical memory recall. In these 
investigations, participants were asked to retrieve memories from specific periods 
of their life, such as each decade (Experiment 1 in Conway & Holmes, 2004), or 
preschool, elementary school, middle school, high school and university years 
(Peterson et al., 2010; Tani et al., 2010).  
On the whole, Manuscript 2 also provided support for the high importance of 
friends in adolescence and thus corroborated findings of previous studies. In these 
studies, friend memories were shown to emphasize closeness over separation and 
conflict (McLean & Thorne, 2003) and to become more accessible and more 
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positive over time, that is, when recalled from different periods of participant’s life 
(Peterson et al., 2010; Tani et al., 2010). 
In addition, by employing a strictly within-subject design (cf. McLean & Thorne, 
2003; Peterson et al., 2010, 2008; Tani et al., 2010), Manuscript 2 clearly 
demonstrated an intra-individual variation in characteristics of autobiographical 
memories across the recalled settings. Similar variation had been previously found 
in bilingual and bicultural individuals, who retrieved autobiographical memories of 
different qualities depending on the language of retrieval or on the participants’ 
cultural background that had been primed prior to the retrieval (Marian & 
Kaushanskaya, 2004; Wang, Shao, & Li, 2010; Wang, 2008). This within-subject 
flexibility in autobiographical memories was here interpreted as a sign of within-
subject flexibility in self, namely that “how the self is represented in a particularly 
context, that is, which aspect of the self is active, salient, and accessible, may 
determine which memories and which aspects of the memories are likely to be 
accessed and retrieved” (Wang, 2008, p. 749). In this sense, Manuscript 2 then 
provided support for the idea that participants’ self was represented differently 
across family, school, and friend settings.  
Finally, Manuscript 2 indicated that for the purpose of investigating self in a 
European context, Kagitcibasi’s (2005, 2007) understanding of autonomy and 
relatedness could be more suitable than Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) notions of 
independence and interdependence. This point was further elaborated in Manuscript 
4 (see section 5.1.4.). 
5.1.3. MANUSCRIPT 3 
Manuscript 3 argued and demonstrated that for the purpose of comparing selves of 
individuals living in post-Communist Europe and Scandinavia, the distinction 
between relational and collective interdependence was particularly instrumental. 
This way, the manuscript substantiated this theoretical distinction (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996; Cross et al., 2000) as well as empirical findings of a recent 
investigation by Mamat and colleagues (Mamat et al., 2014). In Study 1 of this 
investigation, participants from two ethnic groups in China, namely the Uyghur and 
the Han, were asked to write down five personal characteristics, five personal 
relationships, and five group memberships of high self-importance, that is, they 
were prompted to list private, relational, and collective self-descriptions. 
Afterwards, participants were to indicate the importance of each of these self-
descriptions on a scale from 1 to 99, with higher numbers signifying more 
importance. The analysis revealed that the Uyghur gave higher scores to collective 
self-descriptions than to relational self-descriptions, while the Han did the opposite. 
In other words, the sampling of relational and collective interdependence varied 
across the two ethnic groups. This finding then resembled that of the current 
manuscript; only here the degree of relational and collective interdependence 
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differed between generations living in the same country instead of ethnic groups. 
Taken together, the distinction between the two types of interdependence appears 
generally well suited for culture-comparative research on a small scale, such as 
within-country comparisons. Future studies should apply this distinction with 
samples from other societies, for example those that had not been traditionally 
considered collectivist like China or Slovakia.  
On the other hand, even though relational and collective interdependence proved 
instrumental for answering the current thesis’ research question, a closer inspection 
of relevant literature shows that the understanding of the two notions requires 
further refinement. Namely, it appears that the two types of interdependence and 
their relation to independence have been understood inconsistently across different 
authors. Figure 9 illustrates this inconsistency by graphically representing the 
relationships between relational and collective interdependence with independence, 
based on how they have been explicitly or implicitly characterised by some of the 
authors. First, Singelis’ SCS (1994) was intended to measure private and collective 
self (see Triandis, 1989) and thus considered only one type of interdependence, 
namely the collective one. Bresnahan and colleagues (Bresnahan et al., 2005) 
complied with this intention when they inspected validity of three distinct measures 
of self. Specifically, in order to test the measures’ convergent validity, the authors 
correlated the amount of collective self-descriptions on the TST with scores on the 
interdependence subscale of SCS, and the amount of relational self-descriptions 
with scores on the Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal scale (RISC). The 
authors’ choice of the particular pairs of correlates shows that they saw relational 
interdependence as separate from (collective) interdependence measured by SCS 
(see a) in Figure 9). In contrast, Kashima and Hardie (2000) argued that “the 
interdependent self-construal [as described by Markus and Kitayama (1991)] 
contains both collective and relational self-aspects, because of its emphasis on links 
with other individuals and collectives” (p. 21). Thus, according to Kashima and 
Hardie, the two aspects of interdependence need to be disentangled (see b) in Figure 
9). Brewer and Yuki (2007; see also Yuki, 2003) agreed with this argument, but 
they specifically proposed that collective interdependence was compatible with 
independence (see c) in Figure 9). Namely, the authors hypothesized that while 
being a member of large, depersonalized collectives would not interfere with 
pursuit of individual’s independence, appreciation of close, personalized bonds 
might. Hence, an individual could very well be high on both independence and 
collective interdependence. Conversely, Cross and colleagues (Cross et al., 2000) 
maintained that highly independent individuals, like North Americans, would be 
more likely to include close relationships, rather than in-groups, in their self-
representation; i.e. to be more relational- than collective-interdependent (see d) in 
Figure 9). In fact, these authors saw relational interdependence as characteristic of   
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Figure 9. Differences in the understanding of relational and collective interdependence in 
the literature. Schematic representations based on proposals by: a) (Bresnahan et al., 2005; 
Singelis, 1994), b) (E. Kashima & Hardie, 2000), c) (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Yuki, 2003), and 
d) (Cross et al., 2000). Plus indicates compatibility.  
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North Americans, especially North American women (Cross & Madson, 1997). All 
in all, researchers utilizing the notions of relational and collective interdependence 
in the future should be aware of this inconsistency, and potentially consider further 
refinements of these notions.  
One such refinement was put forward by Harb and Smith (2008). Namely, the 
authors pointed to hierarchy as an additional aspect of how self can be seen in 
relation to others and proposed to incorporate this aspect into the tripartite model of 
independent, relational- and collective-interdependent self. This resulted in a 
sixfold differentiation of self into personal self, horizontal-relational self (e.g. me as 
a friend), vertical-relational self (e.g. me as a family member), horizontal-collective 
self (e.g. me as a university student), vertical-collective self (e.g. me as a member 
of a religious denomination), and humanity-bound self (e.g. me as a human being). 
Even though Harb and Smith’s proposal has so far received only limited attention in 
the literature, the idea of hierarchy as an important aspect in conceptualizing self 
had been supported elsewhere. Specifically, Grace and Cramer (2003) identified 
hierarchy as an extra factor comprising Singelis’ SCS besides independence and 
interdependence. In this particular factor analysis (cf. section 2.4.1.), the hierarchy 
factor emerged as consisting of items from both independence (Speaking up during 
class is not a problem for me) and interdependence (I have respect for the authority 
figures with whom I interact) subscales. This result then supported the importance 
of disentangling hierarchy from interdependence in future studies, as also advocated 
by Harb and Smith (2008).  
5.1.4. MANUSCRIPT 4 
Similarly to Manuscript 2, Manuscript 4 emphasized the utility of autobiographical 
memories in cross-cultural research on self. Moreover, Manuscript 4 explicitly 
argued that in order to content analyse these memories, the distinction between 
autonomy and relatedness was more instrumental than the distinction between 
independence and interdependence. This was due to two reasons. First, the latter 
distinction had been intended for studying Western and East Asian populations 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003) and was therefore not particularly suitable for 
investigations with, for instance, individuals living in post-Communist Europe and 
Scandinavia. Second, in contrast to independence-interdependence, autonomy and 
relatedness had been conceptualized as orthogonal constructs (Kagitcibasi, 2005). 
Such conceptualization would then allow for a more nuanced examination of self in 
autobiographical memories, that is, examination along two dimensions instead of 
just one (see section 5.2.2). 
When it comes to the orthogonality of autonomy and relatedness, it is important to 
note that independence and interdependence have also been considered orthogonal, 
and that by a number of authors (e.g. Cross et al., 2000, 2011; Singelis & Bond, 
1999). Yet, most of these authors have mentioned this consideration rather briefly 
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and often referenced only one publication in this respect, namely Singelis (1994). In 
this publication, Singelis introduced his SCS that indeed measures independence 
and interdependence by two separate subscales. However, when presenting 
theoretical arguments for the scale’s development, Singelis drew on Triandis’ 
(1989) distinction between private, public, and collective self, and not Markus and 
Kitayama’s (1991) model of independent and interdependent self. Moreover, 
Singelis provided no apparent reason as to why he then included only two, and not 
three subscales in the SCS; he simply stated that “Only the private and the 
collective selves will be considered here” (Singelis, 1994, p. 582). Therefore, it 
appears that the claim for the orthogonality of independence and interdependence 
has received only limited theoretical and empirical support. While Kam et al. 
(2012) recently provided some empirical evidence for this claim, Kagitcibasi’s 
delineation of autonomy and relatedness still enables a clearer conceptualization 
and a more nuanced measurement of self. 
5.2. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the above, various partial answers to the current thesis’ research question were 
discussed. To bring these answers together, the next three sections combine them 
depending on whether the answers concerned theoretical or methodological issues, 
or whether they drew on the current study’s empirical results.  
5.2.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Cross-cultural literature on self has been dominated by Markus and Kitayama’s 
(1991) model of independent and interdependent self. The model has been mostly 
applied to the two original, North American and East Asian contexts, but also to 
other cultural areas. In the latter case, some studies did not find the expected cross-
cultural differences in independence and interdependence. This questioned the 
utility of this distinction in general and its relevance to the newly explored areas in 
particular (e.g. Kolstad & Horpestad, 2009; Santamaría et al., 2010). In light of 
these findings, the current thesis refrained from simply extending Markus and 
Kitayama’s model to another novel context. Instead, the thesis first thoroughly 
reviewed refinements of the model and then integrated theoretical frameworks that 
these refinements had been based on (see Figure 8). This careful examination of the 
most prominent conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology then lent 
support to the utilization of Kagitcibasi’s (2005, 2007) model of autonomous-
related self (Manuscript 2, Manuscript 4) as well as of the distinction between 
relational and collective self (or interdependence; Manuscript 3) in the current 
study, that is, for the purpose of comparing selves of individuals living in post-
Communist Europe and Scandinavia. Since both of these theoretical proposals are 
refinements of Markus and Kitayama’s model, they equally offer a more nuanced 
conceptualization of self than previously suggested. At the same time, the two 
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proposals differ in substantial ways. Namely, while Kagitcibasi’s model is 
concerned with the degree of autonomy from and relatedness with others, relational 
and collective self specify who these others are. Moreover, autonomy and 
relatedness are conceived of as constituting two distinct dimensions (see Figure 4), 
whereas relational and collective self refer to two distinct types of self. Hence, the 
two proposals focus on different aspects of self and of self’s relation to others, and 
should be utilized accordingly, depending on the particular aim of each study. For 
instance, in the current thesis, self-descriptions in Manuscript 3 were examined for 
explicit mentions of relationships to others and of group memberships. In 
comparison, autobiographical memories in Manuscript 2 and Manuscript 4 were 
coded on several variables, most of which served as indicators of participants’ 
general degree of autonomy and relatedness.  
An overarching theoretical theme of the current thesis was the disentangling of the 
term interdependence. Specifically, Manuscript 2 concerned interdependence with 
family, school, and friends, and Manuscript 3 differentiated between relational and 
collective interdependence. Disentangling interdependence is an important task for 
cross-cultural psychology, since several authors have previously argued that the 
term, similarly to the term collectivism, encompasses multiple meanings. For 
instance, Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) stated that collectivism, here 
used interchangeably with interdependence, “is a diverse construct, joining together 
culturally disparate foci on different kinds and levels of referent groups” (p. 5). 
Fiske (2002) concurred:  
As a construct, collectivism conflates social bonds with all kinds of 
groups and networks. There are many kinds of sociality, and there is no 
reason to believe that cultural emphasis on one kind of relationship, 
identity, membership, or obligation is positively correlated with 
emphases on other kinds. (p. 82) 
One possible reason for this ambiguity is that the two terms have been primarily 
defined by North American psychologists, that is, psychologists from a cultural 
background that supposedly downplays the importance of these ideas, and thus 
might not know much about them: “Collectivism is an abstraction that formalizes 
our [North Americans’] ideological representation of the antithetical other, a 
cultural vision of the rest of the world characterized in terms of what we imagine 
we are not” (Fiske, 2002, p. 84). Levine and colleagues (Levine et al., 2003) found 
support for this North American, or Western bias, with respect to measures of 
interdependence. Specifically, the authors’ meta-analysis of cross-cultural research 
on self showed that, overall, measures of interdependent self worked substantially 
worse than measures of independent self. It appears then that there is a need for 
disentangling interdependence, both theoretically and in measurement. 
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5.2.2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The current thesis relied almost exclusively on open-ended methods and employed 
content analysis of thereby generated data (Manuscript 2, Manuscript 3, and 
Manuscript 4). On the whole, the idea behind this methodological approach was to 
increase cultural sensitivity and hence to decrease the possibility of cultural bias 
(see also section 5.4.). Specifically, participants of the current study were given the 
opportunity to express themselves freely and thus to generate more complex and 
more original data than would have been the case with Likert-type rating scales, for 
example. This way, the study followed a recommendation by Matsumoto (1999), 
who in light of the weak empirical support for Markus and Kitayama’s model 
advocated for more qualitative data in future cross-cultural research, especially 
from understudied cultural areas. At the same time, subsequent coding of 
participants’ answers allowed for quantitative analyses of the generated data and for 
systematic group comparisons, which lie at the heart of cross-cultural psychology 
(Keith, 2011). Taken together, by utilizing content analysis, the current thesis 
combined benefits characteristic of both qualitative and quantitative methodology 
and thus partly of both emic and etic, relativist and universalist, and idiographic and 
nomothetic approaches12. These benefits were summarized by personality 
psychologist Barbara Woike in the paper “Working with Free Response Data: Let’s 
Not Give Up Hope”, which Woike had based on her own experience with content 
analysis of autobiographical memories (see section 2.4.3.): 
By using free response methods, we are able to study personality 
through both idiographic and nomothetic lenses. The nature of free 
responses gives individuals the opportunity to tell a story in a way that is 
uniquely their own. For the researcher, this leaves open the possibilities 
that there may be patterns in the data that were not expected and that 
would have gone undetected with standardized, fixed choices questions. 
. . . Once reliable content analytic procedures are developed, specific 
hypotheses can be tested through group comparison. In this sense, the 
free response method offers the best of both worlds: it allows us to 
analyse reliably the idiographic content of responses, then validate our 
hunches through group comparisons. (Woike, 2001, p. 158) 
Furthermore, the current thesis substantiated the use of autobiographical memories 
as new measures of self. The need for such measures was first indicated by a review 
of the most common, already existing instruments for gauging self in cross-cultural 
psychology (see section 2.4.). Thereafter, both previously established as well as 
                                                            
12 As briefly mentioned in section 5.1.1., idiographic approach “emphasises unique 
characteristics and experiences of the individual”, while nomothetic approach “looks for 
common and usually measurable factors on which individuals differ” (Coolican, 2009, p. 
583).  
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novel methodological approaches to autobiographical memory recall and analysis 
were implemented in the design of the current study. For instance, various kinds of 
autobiographical memories were queried from the study’s participants, such as 
earliest childhood memories (Manuscript 4) and meaningful memories about 
different interpersonal contexts (Manuscript 2). Hence, both temporal markers (i.e. 
earliest) and cue words (i.e. family, school, and friends) were used to prompt 
autobiographical memory retrieval. In addition, several self-reported as well as 
coded memory variables were applied (Manuscript 2) or developed specifically for 
purposes of the current study (Manuscript 4). Self-reported variables were 
concerned with memories’ temporal distribution (e.g. age of the earliest childhood 
memory) or accessibility (e.g. prior rehearsal). In comparison, coded memory 
variables regarded content characteristics of memories (e.g. other-self ratio). Here, 
special attention was given to the coding for autonomy and relatedness, since the 
degree of inclusion of others in one’s self is central to the investigation of self in 
cross-cultural psychology (see section 1.2.). In previous research, autonomy and 
relatedness were coded by simply counting references to self and others (other-self 
ratio) or by identifying references to personal preferences, avoidances, evaluations, 
and agentic behaviour (autonomous orientation). Instead, the new coding procedure 
presented in Manuscript 4 distinguished between whether it was self, others, or both 
that was the subject of each coding unit (Step 2 of the coding procedure), and 
whether these subjects acted in an explicitly autonomous or heteronomous way 
(Step 4). Moreover, presence of people other than the subject in a coding unit 
indicated further relatedness (Step 4). This way, the procedure allowed a more 
nuanced identification of autonomy and relatedness in autobiographical memories, 
specifically, a differentiation between autonomy and relatedness of self and 
autonomy and relatedness of others.  
Finally, it is important to note that in accordance with Kagitcibasi’s theoretical 
framework (see Figure 4), the new coding procedure presented in Manuscript 4 
enabled a concomitant coding of autonomy and relatedness. Specifically, in Step 4, 
it was possible for the same coding unit to receive a score in both. In contrast, the 
coding system utilized in Manuscript 3 assigned self-descriptions only to one of the 
three categories: either private, relational, or group. Hence, the difference between 
these two approaches illustrates that orthogonality of autonomy and relatedness, 
and of independence and interdependence, is as much a theoretical as it is a 
methodological question (see section 5.1.4.).  
5.2.3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
When it comes to the empirical findings of the current study, the lack of differences 
between older Slovaks and older Danes (Manuscript 3) stands out. Specifically, 
even though these two groups have spent most of their lives under radically 
different political systems, statistical analyses showed that they still maintained 
very similar types of self. How can such high degree of similarity be explained? 
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Indeed, some resemblance in people of the same age should be expected, and that 
due to the universal developmental patterns that are biologically determined, such 
as health deterioration (Westerhof, Dittmann-Kohli, & Katzko, 2000). Moreover, 
some authors have speculated that individuals living in times of social change may 
not necessarily become affected by this change as strongly as one would expect. For 
instance, developmental psychologists Martin Pinquart and Rainer K. Silbereisen 
(2004; see also Valsiner, 1997) argued that the individual experience of social 
change was mediated by changes in the individual’s immediate developmental 
settings (microsystems) and by the interplay between them. Hence, if changes in the 
respective microsystems had not been large enough to pressure the individual to 
alter his or her old behaviour, the effects of social change on individual’s everyday 
life would have been minimal. A study by Goodwin and colleagues (Goodwin et al., 
2001) suggested this scenario to be plausible. Namely, when the authors asked 
participants from Russia, Georgia, and Hungary to list three changes that had 
occurred in their life as a direct result of the fall of Communism, only 52% of the 
participants were able to fulfil this task. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) concurred:  
It [value change] requires more than modifications of the political 
atmosphere and of prevailing ideological messages. It depends upon 
transformations of the actual life conditions to which people are 
exposed. Only as the opportunities and reward contingencies that people 
confront in daily life are changed, do we expect value priorities to shift. 
(p. 407)  
An alternative explanation for the lack of differences between older Slovaks and 
older Danes in the current study is that the political systems these two groups of 
participants have lived in were not entirely different from each other. For example, 
Moodie and colleagues listed isolation of individuals, loneliness, and conformity as 
common features of totalitarian collectivism and democratic individualism (Moodie 
et al., 1997). Uichol Kim (U. Kim, 1994) mentioned a shift from ascribed to 
achieved relationships as characteristic of both communist and capitalist societies. 
Furthermore, some empirical support for these claims can be found in the analyses 
of societal-level data from the 1981-1998 World Values Survey (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). Here, one of the study’s findings was that older generations in post-
Communist countries endorsed values comparable to their matching generations in 
other societies. This surprising likeness was explained by two factors, namely 
drastic eradication of traditional values and religion during Communism as well as 
the initial rapid economic growth in former Communist countries. These societal 
trends, Inglehart and Baker hypothesized, had caused people in the Communist 
Europe to embrace at least some of the values normally promoted in advanced 
industrial societies, that is, values that are rather secular than traditional. All in all, 
while both of these explanations remain tentative, future research should test 
whether findings of the current study replicate with participants of similar age from 
other former Communist and non-Communist countries.  
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Another intriguing result of the current study is the pattern of independence and 
interdependence found in young Norwegians, Danes, and Slovaks. First, inspection 
of mean scores reported in Manuscript 2 indicates that across family, school and 
friend memories, Norwegian adolescents were more other-oriented than their 
Slovak counterparts. Since the other-self ratio variable counted references to others 
in concrete memory descriptions, it is possible to hypothesize that the variable is a 
better indicator of participants’ relational rather than collective interdependence. On 
the other hand, mean scores in the expressed autonomy variable did not follow a 
clear pattern apart from staying somewhat elevated (cf. Wang, 2001) across 
memories as well as samples. Assuming that this particular variable signifies 
participants’ independence, both Norwegian and Slovak sample then emerge as 
quite independent and thus comparable to the young Danes and Slovaks featured in 
Manuscript 3. Indeed, these participant groups provided predominantly private (i.e. 
independent) self-descriptions when responding to a shortened TST. On top of that, 
Slovaks also referred to their significant group memberships more often than 
Danes. Taken together, Manuscript 2 and Manuscript 3 demonstrate a high 
independence in young people from Scandinavia as well as post-Communist 
Europe, and specifically, independence that is combinable with both relational 
(young Norwegians) and collective (young Slovaks) interdependence (see section 
5.1.). Moreover, the manuscripts point to the convergence of the two measures of 
self employed in the current study, namely self-descriptions and autobiographical 
memories, thereby corroborating findings of previous research (Wang, 2001, 2004).  
All in all, it is possible to point out a number of theoretical, methodological, and 
empirical contributions of the current thesis. First, the thesis thoroughly reviewed 
the most prominent conceptualizations of self in cross-cultural psychology. Here, it 
specifically focused on disentangling the term interdependence, in line with 
recommendations by other authors. Second, the thesis critically examined the most 
common measures of self and appropriated some of them for comparative research 
in a European context. In this respect, the thesis demonstrated the utility of content 
analysis in general and of content analysis of autobiographical memories in 
particular. Finally, by investigating self in post-Communist Europe and 
Scandinavia, the current study generated novel data for the field of cross-cultural 
psychology and thereby extended findings of the field’s previous research that had 
predominantly featured North American and Asian populations. The generational 
data from post-Communist Europe was particularly valuable, since it provided a 
unique opportunity to study the influence of sociopolitical change on self. 
Moreover, by being comparative on a considerably smaller scale than typically 
adopted in the literature, the study enabled a test of the field’s central theoretical 
models outside their traditional scope of application, that is, East versus West. 
Taken together, it can be argued that the current thesis brought the field of cross-
cultural psychology a bit closer to becoming universal (Berry et al., 2011; Triandis, 
1996).  
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Nonetheless, the aforementioned contributions of the current thesis ought to be seen 
in light of the current study’s limitations, which are discussed below.  
5.3. EVALUATION OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
On the whole, the current study employed a non-experimental rather than 
experimental design, since it neither exercised control over its independent 
variables nor used random assignment of participants to different test conditions 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Instead, the study compared members of 
specific population groups, and that based on a priori defined characteristics of 
these groups, such as age or cultural background. Coolican (2009) referred to this 
type of studies as group difference studies. Understandably, group difference 
studies are quite common in cross-cultural research, which is why it can be more 
difficult to establish validity in this area of investigation as compared to others 
(Berry et al., 2011; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2011). Moreover, since the comparison of 
participant groups in the current study was carried out at one specific point in time, 
the study’s design can also be characterized as cross-sectional. In general, cross-
sectional designs do not allow causal inferences, thereby delimiting the studies’ 
internal validity. However, some degree of internal validity can still be established 
in these studies, and that by controlling for potentially confounding variables, such 
as participants’ demographic characteristics. For example, while participant groups 
in the current study were compared by age and cultural background, they were 
roughly equivalent in their distribution of gender and educational level. 
Broadly speaking, external validity is “the validity of inferences about whether the 
cause-effect relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment 
variables, and measurement variables” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 38). In particular, 
external validity includes population validity, which refers to the extent to which 
study’s results can be generalised from the study’s sample to other people from the 
same population as well as to people in general (Coolican, 2009). In this respect, 
the samples used in the current study were not representative of their respective 
populations, as they came from specific regions in the three countries. Moreover, 
the samples were recruited by the means of non-probability-based sampling 
methods, namely convenience and snowball sampling (Coolican, 2009). These 
sampling methods then might have increased the possibility of sampling bias and 
thus decreased the population validity of the current study. To circumvent such 
limitations in future research, representative samples and probability sampling 
methods should be used instead.  
External validity also encompasses ecological validity, which is concerned with the 
results’ generalizability outside the specific research context (Berry et al., 2011). 
On the one hand, results of the current study can be argued to generalize to real-life 
situations, since the study’s data was collected in a naturalistic setting as well as 
generated through tasks that presumably bear resemblance to daily life activities, 
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namely self-description and autobiographical memory recall. On the other hand, the 
studies’ results might not be generalizable to other research contexts, as 
characteristics of the setting for data collection varied across participants in general 
and across young and old participants in particular (see section 3.2.). This variation 
could have similarly impeded the external reliability of the current study’s findings, 
that is, their replicability. Future investigations carried out in more controlled 
settings are therefore recommended. 
A particularly important issue in cross-cultural research is equivalence, which is “a 
state or condition of similarity in conceptual meaning and empirical method 
between cultures that allows comparisons to be meaningful” (Matsumoto & Yoo, 
2006, p. 243). In this respect, it is possible to distinguish between conceptual and 
measurement equivalence (Berry et al., 2011). The former type can here be 
assumed without much difficulty, since the current study was conducted in rather 
similar cultural contexts, that  is, within Europe. When it comes to the latter type, it 
is possible to argue that the open-ended format of the employed methods, their 
back-translation, and the careful elaboration of coding procedures contributed to the 
establishment of measurement equivalence.  
Keeping the aforementioned limitations in mind, some recommendations for future 
research are proposed here. First, due to the strikingly similar levels of 
independence found across the study’s subsamples, further theoretical and empirical 
disentanglement of this notion should be considered in future investigations. The 
same suggestion applies to the notions of relational and collective interdependence, 
as argued in section 5.1.3. and illustrated in Figure 9 above. Second, while the 
distinction between the two types of interdependence was instrumental in the 
current study, future comparative research on a similarly small scale should verify 
the general utility of this distinction. For instance, relational and collective 
interdependence could be compared in participants from urban versus rural areas or 
in participants with low versus high levels of formal education. Third, future 
research should test the replicability of the current study’s findings, most notably 
the lack of differences between older Slovaks and older Danes, and that by 
comparing participants of similar age from other former Communist and non-
Communist countries. Finally, the new coding procedure for content analysis of 
autobiographical memories should be applied in future investigations. In this 
respect, the convergence between the Twenty Statements Test and autobiographical 
memories coded according to this procedure should be tested as well.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
One of the main aims of cross-cultural psychology has been to test the universality 
of psychological theories and concepts (Berry et al., 2011; U. Kim, 2000). This is in 
order to ensure that contemporary psychology moves away from being an 
exclusively Western psychology and that instead, its postulates and findings apply 
to humanity as a whole. In this respect, inclusion of novel data collected in 
understudied cultural areas has been crucial. The current thesis has generated such 
data, and that by having queried participants from post-Communist Europe and 
Scandinavia, respectively. 
On the other hand, cross-cultural psychology has been dominated by large-scale, 
West versus East comparisons, encompassing cultures expected to be extremely 
different from one another. The more recent trend, however, has been to go beyond 
such comparisons and to instead test the field’s central theories on a smaller scale, 
that is, within continents (Ciochină & Faria, 2009; Pouliasi & Verkuyten, 2012) or 
even within countries (Mamat et al., 2014). The current thesis has followed this 
trend, and that by comparing exclusively European populations. 
At the same time, routine extension of the field’s central theories, such as Markus 
and Kitayama’s (1991) model of independent and interdependent self, outside their 
original scope of application has been disputed. Quite the contrary, different 
cultural groups have been shown to construct their selves in other ways than in the 
accordance with the Western notion of independence or the Eastern notion of 
interdependence (Kagitcibasi, 2007). Consequently, the utility of the existing 
measures of self has become questioned (Bresnahan et al., 2005; Levine et al., 
2003). The current thesis has paid attention to these issues, and that by to adapting 
and further developing appropriate theoretical and methodological tools for use in 
the current study. 
All in all, the current thesis can be seen as an important theoretical, methodological 
as well as empirical contribution to the field of cross-cultural psychology.  
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Appendix A. Questionnaire 
 
 
Research on childhood memories and 
self-description  
 
We would like to ask you to participate in this research by filling in the following tasks and 
answering the following questions according to the instructions. 
 
It is important that you fill in the pages in the order they appear.  
 
Write as much as you consider is enough for you to give an appropriate answer. In case the 
space set is not enough for you, use the back side of the paper. 
 
After completion, give all the sheets you have received to the researcher. 
 
Thank you for your cooperation and help! 
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Earliest childhood memory 
 
Describe your earliest childhood memory, that is: what is the first, earliest thing 
(situation or event) that you remember from your childhood? Please describe as many 
details as you can, even if you maybe don’t remember everything about the situation. 
Try to write only what you remember yourself and not something you have seen on 
photographs or what your family has told you about. 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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1. How old were you, when the given event happened? 
 
______ years ______ months  
 
2. How did you feel in this situation? (Please, circle one of the options on the scale 
from 1 – very bad to 7 – very good) 
 
Very bad                                                                                                              Very good  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. What specific emotions were you experiencing during this situation? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Have you ever thought of or talked about this memory? (Please, circle one of the 
options on the scale from 1 – never before to 7 – very often) 
 
Never before                                                                                                       Very often 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
5. In general: how often do you think of or talk about your early childhood 
memories? (Please, circle one of the options on the scale from 1 – never before to 
7 – very often) 
 
Never                                                                                                                   Very often 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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TST Questionnaire 
 
Please fill in the following ten empty lines with different sentences or words that 
describe you the best.  
 
 
I AM_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I AM ______________________________________________________________________ 
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Personal Information 
 
 
Fill in the following information, please. 
 
We are not asking for your name, your answers will stay anonymous. 
 
SEX_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
AGE_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
PLACE OF BIRTH___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WHERE DO YOU LIVE NOW?_________________________________________________ 
 
 
WHERE DO YOUR PARENTS LIVE?___________________________________________ 
 
 
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS______________________________________________________ 
 
 
WHICH CHILD ARE YOU (oldest, youngest, in the middle, etc.)? _____________________ 
 
 
 
 
MARITAL STATUS (living with partner, single)___________________________________ 
 
 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN (if any)______________________________________________ 
 
 
FIELD OF STUDY___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
RELIGION_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
                                   Thank you once again for your cooperation and help! 
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Appendix B. TST coding system, 
earlier version 
Category Subcategory Example 
Personal Personality types I am an extrovert 
 Hobbies, activities, 
preferences  
I am a good cook 
 Mood-related I am joyful 
 Skilled I am creative 
 Active  I am diligent 
 Independent  I am self-confident 
 Emotional I am sensitive 
 Responsible  I am reliable 
 Goal-oriented I am ambitious 
 Passive  I am shy 
Relational explicit  With people in general I like to help others 
 With specific people I like company of people I know 
 Other people say…  I am an all-rounder (at least my 
colleagues say that) 
Relational implicit  Sociable I am friendly 
 Communicative I am chatty 
 Invested I am caring 
 Entertaining  I am funny 
 Jealous  I am jealous 
 Susceptible  I am susceptible 
Group small (family relationships)  I am a mother 
Group big  Horoscope signs  I am a Leo 
 Job positions I am a teacher 
 Human I am a human 
 References to society, 
authorities, institutions 
I am a citizen 
 Gender I am a woman 
APPENDIX C. CODING OF OTHER-SELF RATIO 
APP 7 
Appendix C. Coding of other-self ratio 
Type of reference Example Decision 
Possessive  I cut my forehead open One reference to self 
All, together, alone I said goodbye to 
everybody 
One reference to self, one 
reference to other 
Long description The neighbours’’ older 
son 
One reference to other 
Multiple adjectives I was young and 
immature 
One reference to self 
Infinitive I loved to be carried  One reference to self 
My, our My dog  One reference to self 
 My dad  One reference to other 
Multiple verbs I was outside and was 
playing 
One reference to self 
 We were eating and 
drinking 
Two references to self, 
two references to other 
Dependent clause The man who was 
marrying my parents  
Two references to other 
Authority  Police and ambulance 
arrived right away  
Two references to other 
One of…  One of my friends  One reference to other 
Indirect speech I told my mum she should 
hurry up  
One reference to self, two 
references to other 
Category As a five-year old  No reference counted 
Family On vacation with family One reference to self, one 
reference to other 
Indirect reference It was easy to breathe No reference counted 
One (“man” in Danish)  One could sit on it  One reference to other 
Adjective I, angry, kicked into it  One reference to self 
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Appendix D. Ethical approval 
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Appendix E. Informed consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
 
Please read the following information carefully and sign below to confirm that 
you understand them and give your consent to participate.  
 
 
Project: Research on childhood memories and self-descriptions 
Project type: PhD project 
Researcher: Radka Antalíková, cand. psych., PhD student  
Affiliation: Department of Communication of Psychology, Aalborg University in 
Aalborg, Denmark.  
Supervisors: Tia Hansen, PhD, Associate Professor at Aalborg University,   
Kristine Jensen de López, PhD, Associate Professors at Aalborg 
University 
Aim: To look at how people describe themselves and what kind of childhood 
memories they have.  
Form: To participate in this project, you will fill out a written questionnaire 
consisting of five pages. This should take about 15 to 20 minutes.  
Participation: Your involvement in this project is completely voluntary, and you are 
free to withdraw consent at any time, and to withdraw any unprocessed 
data previously supplied without any negative consequences. 
Anonymity: All the information you will provide by answering the questionnaire 
will remain confidential. Only this consent form contains your name, 
and it is will be separated from the questionnaire before data analysis 
begins. 
Outcomes: The outcomes of this project will be presented in a PhD dissertation 
thesis and scientific article. Your identity as a participant will not be 
disclosed in these, as the results will be presented in a collective 
fashion.  
 
 
For the research team:  
 
 
_________________________________   ________________ 
Signature      Date 
 
The participant:  
 
 
_________________________________   ________________ 
Signature      Date 
Radka Antalíková 
Department of Communication 
and Psychology 
Kroghstræde 3, Room 4.228 
9220 Aalborg Øst, Denmark 
Email: radonka@hum.aau.dk 
Phone: 0045 50 27 07 61 
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Taking the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, the current thesis sets 
out to investigate self in a European context. For this purpose, the thesis 
first thoroughly reviews the most prominent conceptualizations of self in 
cross-cultural psychology, specifically focusing on disentangling the term 
interdependence. Thereafter, the thesis critically examines the most common 
measures of self and appropriates some of these measures for use in the cur-
rent empirical study. More concretely, the current study compares self-de-
scriptions and autobiographical memories of individuals from post-Com-
munist Europe and Scandinavia. The study’s results exemplify participants’ 
interdependence, whether in the form of their relational and group self-de-
scriptions or their autobiographical memories recalled to different interper-
sonal cue words. On the whole, the current thesis contributes with novel data 
to the field of cross-cultural psychology, specifically highlighting the utility 
of autobiographical memories as measures of self.
